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RECENT DECISIONS
BANKRUPTCY-Wage Earners' Plan-Two Chapter 13 plans
may not be maintained at the same time. In re Webb (4th Cir.
1967).
In November 1964, the debtor received confirmation of an
extension plan under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Act.1 This
plan was in the course of being administered when the debtor
filed a petition for confirmation of a new plan. The petition
was filed in order to include additional creditors who had been
placing garnishments with the debtor's employer, a large cor-
poration, which was not willing to retain employees whose earn-
ings were the subject of repeated garnishments. The referee
dismissed the petition because of the existence of the earlier plan
and the district court affirmed.2 On appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, held, affirmed. When
one Chapter 13 extension plan is in existence, a new and addi-
tional plan cannot be confirmed and brought into being. In re
Webb, 374 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1967).
The Wage Earners' Plan, Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Act,
was established by the Chandler Act of 1938. The purpose of
Chapter 13 is to provide an efficient and effective method by
which persons dependent on wages can effectuate a settlement
with their creditors, either by means of a composition or an
extension of time.3 A composition plan contemplates only par-
tial payment of debts, while an extension plan has as its goal the
full payment of all debts. The use of Chapter 13 is limited to
individuals whose principal income is derived from wages, sal-
ary, or commissions. 4 The debtor may enter Chapter 13 by an
original petition in the same court that would have jurisdiction
in a straight bankruptcy proceeding; 5 or, if a bankruptcy peti-
tion is pending, he may enter by a converter petition either
1. Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1001-86 (1964).
2. In re Webb, 253 F. Supp. 757 (E.D. Va. 1966).
3. 9 H. REMINGToN, BANKaupTcy LAw § 3747 (6th ed. 1955).
4. Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1002, 1006(3), 1006(8) (1964). Chapter
13 originally was limited to individuals whose wages did not exceed $3,600.
Bankruptcy Act § 606(8), ch. 575, 52 Stat. 931 (1938). The wage limitation
was increased in 1950 to $5,000. Bankruptcy Act § 606(8), CI. 1193, 64 Stat.
1134 (1950). In 1959 the monetary ceiling was removed. Bankruptcy Act, 11
U.S.C. § 1006(8) (1964).
5. Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1022 (1964).
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before or after his adjudication.6 The debtor must allege that he
is insolvent and unable to pay his debts as they mature and that
he desires to effect a composition or an extension of time, or
both, out of his future earnings or wages.7 The powers of the
court under Chapter 13 are generally those of a court in straight
bankruptcy.8 Procedurally, the clerk refers the petition to a
referee who, upon notice to creditors, both secured and unse-
cured, calls a meeting of them.9 At this meeting the debtor
submits his proposed plan, and the court accepts proof of claims
from the creditors.' 0 If the debtor's plan is accepted unani-
mously and in writing1" by all of the creditors, or by a majority
of the unsecured creditors whose claims have been proved and
allowed and all the secured creditors dealt with by the plan,'
1 2
the court will confirm, and a trustee will be appointed to receive
and disburse funds. The plan, once confirmed, is binding upon
the debtor and all the creditors.' 3 Upon the debtor's compliance
with all of the terms of the plan and upon completion of all
payments, the court may enter an order discharging the debtor
from all of his debts under the plan.14 However, if three years
have passed since the confirmation of the plan and the debtor
has not completed his payments, the court may grant a discharge
if it is satisfied that the failure to complete the payments was
not due to circumstances for which the debtor could be account-
able.' 5 If before discharge the debtor defaults in respect to the
performance of any of the terms of the confirmed plan, the
Chapter 13 proceeding may be dismissed without a discharge,
6. Id. at § 1021.
7. Id. at § 1023.
8. Id. at § 1012.
9. Id. at N8 1006(1)-(2), 1031-32.
10. Id. at § 1033.
11. Id. at § 1051. Under this provision the plan may be confirmed whether or
not the claims of the creditors have been proved, if in the court's opinion the
plan is made in good faith and without any means forbidden by the Act.
12. Id. at § 1052. There are other requisites that must be met before
confirmation. Id. at § 1056. See generally C. NADLEP, THE LAW oF DmaroR
RrLEF §§ 546-53 (1954).
13. Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1057 (1964). This is true whether or not
the creditors are affected by the plan or have accepted it or have filed their
claims, and whether or not their claims have been scheduled or allowed or
allowable.
14. Id. at § 1060.
15. Id. at § 1061.
[Vol. 19
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or the debtor may be subjected to regular bankruptcy pro-
ceedings.16
In re WVebb' 7 presented the court with a situation that was
neither covered by Chapter 13 nor any previous decision. The
appellant sought confirmation of a plan, which would include
his new creditors, but the court refused to confirm the new plan
while the old plan was in existence. The court recognized that
the existence of two plans, operating side by side, would prob-
ably lead to confusion and abuse. Furthermore, the court could
find no provision under Chapter 13 which would allow the new
creditors to be included in the old plan. Chapter 13 provides
for alteration or modification of a plan prior to its confirma-
tion'8 or within six months after confirmation, if there was
fraud in the procuring of the plan.' 9 Further, creditors may
file their claims anytime within six months after their first
meeting.20 But no other provisions are made for creditors to
file claims after confirmation. The appellant debtor argued
that since he had incurred debts exceeding the maximum allowed
under the plan,2 1 the original plan was ipso facto terminated
and therefore the court could confirm the new plan. Rejecting
this argument the court reasoned that under the language of the
plan, a violation of the debt limitation may afford grounds for
dismissal, but it does not dismiss the case or per se terminate the
plan.
Section 666 of the Bankruptcy Act 22 provides for dismissal of
an extension plan if the debtor defaults in connection with any
of the terms of the plan after its confirmation, and it appears
to have been well within the court's power to dismiss the existing
plan in In re Webb. But the court could not have confirmed the
new plan, even if it had held that two plans could exist simul-
taneously, because the new plan did not have the required
16. Id. at § 1066.
17. In re Webb, 374 F2d 186 (4th Cir. 1967).
18. Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1053 (1964).
19. Id. at § 1071.
20. In re Maye, 180 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Va. 1958).
21. The lower court, in confirming the existing plan, provided that "in any
event the indebtedness of the debtor for money borrowed or for merchandise
purchased on credit subsequent to the filing of his petition to effect a plan
this plan shall thereupon terminate. .. ." In re Webb, 374 F.2d 186 (4th Cir.
1967).
22. Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1066 (1964).
1967]
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approval of the creditors, both old and new. 28 The court was
willing to dismiss the existing plan only if the new plan was
approved by the creditors and upon the determination of "the
facts and the equities in the light of all Chapter XII require-
ments.1
2 4
The decision in this case points up certain shortcomings of
Chapter 13. Under it the court cannot enforce good faith com-
pliance; rather, the proceedings depend on voluntary compliance
by the debtor in order to be effective. The debtor, therefore,
may abandon the plan at any time by default. But, even assum-
ing the cooperation of the debtor, the primary effect of Chapter
13 seems to be in reducing existing debts. However, the main
problem, the misuse of credit, is not attacked. The debtor, while
under a Chapter 13 proceeding, may continue to use credit and
thus emerge from the plan in the same over-extended position in
which he entered.25 It seems necessary that Chapter 13 should
have some method of enforcing the debtor's use of credit during
the administration of the plan in order to insure the position of
the present creditors. But even if good faith compliance is not
required, the provisions of Chapter 13 should be made more
flexible so as to meet adequately the situations that may arise.
The court in In. re Webb could not modify the old plan to in-
clude the additional creditors, nor could they create a new plan.
This lack of "power" seriously endangered the success of the
plan. In order to attain their goal, which is to relieve the over-
burdened wage earner from his debts without exposing him to
the stigma of bankruptcy, Chapter 13 provisions must be able to
adjust to the changing needs of the debtor; this degree of flexi-
bility is not currently provided.28
RcnARD B. KAT , JR.
23. Id. at §§ 1051-52
24. In re Webb, 374 F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1967).
25. Comment, Should Chapter XIII Bankruptcy Be Involuntary?, 44 TEXAs
L. REv. 533, 545 (1966).
26. For discussion of the proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy Act which
are intended to give the referees and the courts more discretionary powers, see
Comment, Wage Earner Bankruptcy: A Neglected Remedy?, 34 FORDHAM
L. REv. 528 (1966).
[Vol. 19
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CIVIL REMEDIES AND PROCEDURE-Declaratory Judgment
-Declaratory judgment action is available to determine the
validity or priority of mortgages covering the same property.
Bankc of Augusta v. Satcher Motor Company (S.C. 1967).
The Bank of Augusta brought an action against Satcher
Motor Company and others, seeking a declaratory judgment to
establish the priority of its chattel mortgage on an automobile.
Two of the defendants, Satcher Motor Company and Commer-
cial Credit Corporation, interposed separate demurrers to the
complaint. Taken together, these demurrers questioned first,
whether the complaint stated a cause of action for declaratory
judgment, and second, whether several causes of action had been
improperly joined in the complaint. The Common Pleas Court
of Richland County overruled the demurrers and appeal was
taken. The Supreme Court of South Carolina, held, affirmed.
Declaratory judgment action was available to determine the
validity or priority of mortgages covering the same property.
Banke of Augusta v. Satcher Motor Company, 249 S.C. 53, 152
S.E.2d 676 (1967).
The law relating to demurrers to petitions for declaratory
judgments has become generally well settled in South Carolina.
In overruling the demurrer in Bank of Augusta v. Satcher Motor
Co.,' the court, in effect, wrote a summary of this law.
The court was not concerned with the merits of the contro-
versy. It was, however, concerned with whether the plaintiff
was entitled to a declaration of his rights.2 In order to be so
entitled, the plaintiff had only to prove the existence of a jus-
ticiable controversy3 and, the court found that the determination
of the priority of mortgages on the same chattel was such a
controversy. 4
During the trial the defendants raised two basic arguments:
first, that the plaintiff had available other remedies for the
assertion of his rights and second, that the complaint improperly
united several causes of action.5 On the first point, the court
1. 249 S.C. 53, 152 S.E2d 676 (1967).
2. See Dantzler v. Callison, 277 S.C. 317, 88 S.E2d 64 (1955); Foster v.
Foster, 226 S.C. 130, 83 S.E2d 752 (1954).
3. E.g., Hardwick v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 162, 133 S.E.2d 71
(1963) ; Plenge v. Russell, 236 S.C. 473, 115 S.E2d 177 (1960).
4. Bank of Augusta v. Satcher Motor Co., 249 S.C. 53, 152 S.E.2d 676
(1967).
19671
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stated that the fact that other remedies were available did not
preclude the action for a declaratory judgment.6 The court
relied upon the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act7 which
provides that "[c]ourts of record within their respective juris-
dictions shall have power to declare rights, status and other
legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be
claimed.118 The court recognized, however, that declaratory
relief would be refused where a special statutory remedy was
available or where a more appropriate remedy could be ob-
tained.9 Regarding the second contention, the court simply
stated that a request for a declaration of a first lien on the
chattel did not improperly unite causes of action. 10 In uphold-
ing the lower court decision, the Supreme Court of South Caro-
lina decided, for the first time, that declaratory judgment relief
could be granted in determining the priority of mortgages on
the same property.
Prior to this decision the court had indicated that a mortgagee
had three general remedies when a chattel mortgage became
past due:"' (1) he could take peaceable possession of the chattel
in order to sell it;12 (2) if possession was refused, he could take
possession by claim and delivery for the purpose of sale as in the
first instance;13 (3) or he could institute proceedings to fore-
close the chattel mortgage. 14 It now becomes important to de-
cide the comparative merits of these traditional remedies and the
declaratory judgment relief as each applies to priority of mort-
gage adjudications.
Claim and delivery is an action in rem, that is, a proceeding
to obtain possession of the chattel for the purpose of sale.15 If
5. Brief for Appellants at 4, Bank of Augusta v. Satcher Motor Co., 249
S.C. 53, 152 S.E.2d 676 (1967).
6. Bank of Augusta v. Satcher Motor Co., 249 S.C. 53, 152 S.E.2d 676, 679
(1967).
7. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-2001 to-2014 (1962).
8. Id. at § 10-2002.
9. Bank of Augusta v. Satcher Motor Co., 249 S.C. 53, 58, 152 S.E2d 676,
679 (1967).
10. Id.
11. Speizman v. Guill, 202 S.C. 498, 25 S.E.2d 731 (1943).
12. Justus v. Universal Credit Co., 189 S.C. 487, 1 S.E.2d 508 (1939).
13. Castell v. Stephenson Fin. Co., 244 S.C. 45, 135 S.E2d 311 (1964).
14. W. C. Caye & Co. v. Saul, 229 S.C. 306, 92 S.E.2d 696 (1956).
15. See Note, Claim and Delivery it South Carolina, 18 S.C.L. REv. 240
(1966). See gencrally Castell v. Stephenson Fin. Co., 244 S.C. 45, 135 S.E.2d
311 (1964); Elders v. Feutrel, 110 S.C. 307, 96 S.E. 541 (1918); Rish v.
Jackson, 104 S.C. 163, 88 S.E. 380 (1916).
[Vol. 19
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a deficiency results after the application of the proceeds of sale
to the debt, an action can be maintained against the mortgagor
for the deficiency. 6 When compared with the declaratory judg-
ment, claim and delivery reveals two comparative disadvantages.
First, the plaintiff becomes vulnerable to suit for wrongful con-
version of the chattel if it is proved that he does not hold the
prior mortgage or has in some way assumed unlawful posses-
sion.17 Second, the plaintiff must assume the expense of secur-
ing a written undertaking or bond by one or more sheriff-
approved sureties.18 If granted, the declaratory judgment action
not only will avoid a potential conversion action but can ulti-
mately result in the plaintiff's being given possession of the
chattel without the expense of a bond.19
The plaintiff can avoid this possible liability for wrongful
conversion by bringing a suit in equity to foreclose on the mort-
gage. In this foreclosure proceeding, however, the plaintiff must
join all subsequent holders of rights in the mortgaged property
in order that their rights to redeem may be foreclosed along
with those of the mortgagor.20 These rights generally include
subsequent mortgages and other liens. In the present case the
mortgagor of the chattel to the Bank of Augusta was domiciled
outside of South Carolina. The chattel was in the possession of
a subsequent bona fide purchaser for value who was domiciled
in South Carolina. The subsequent mortgagee of the chattel
was a registered company doing business in South Carolina. To
bring suit to foreclose in equity would have involved a jurisdic-
tional problem because the original mortgagor would have had
to be named a party. The declaratory judgment, as it had been
filed, had excluded the mortgagor as a defendant. Since this
mortgagor had defaulted on his mortgage, the Bank of Augusta
had title to the chattel, subject to the priority of lien determina-
16. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Platt, 239 S.C. 103, 121, S.E.2d 351
(1961).
17. 14 C.J.S. Chattel Mortgages § 215 (1939); see Castell v. Stephenson
Fin. Co., 244 S.C. 45, 135 S.E.2d 311 (1964); GMAC v. Hanahan, 146 S.C.
257, 143 S.E.2d 820 (1928).
18. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2505 (1962).
19. The Uniform Declaratory judgments Act, S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 10-2000
to -2014 (1962), does not expressly require a bond.
20. G. CLARx, SummARY or AmRIcAN LAv 370 (1947). See generally
W.C. Caye & Co. v. Saul, 229 S.C. 306, 92 S.E.2d 696 (1956). Cf. 14 C.J.S.
Chattel Mortgages § 403 (1939).
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tion.23' A declaratory judgment to determine lien priorities
could give the plaintiff the chattel free of the defaulted mort-
gagor and could avoid the jurisdictional problem.
While the purpose of a declaratory judgment is normally to
define the rights of the parties to the action, the Uniform Decla-
ratory Judgments Act expressly provides for a type of coercive
or incidental relief.22 In its complaint the Bank of Augusta
asked for the possession of the mortgaged chattel in accordance
with the terms of its note and mortgage.2 3 The court indicated
that the request for this type of relief properly falls within the
coverage of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.24 Unless
a deficiency judgment is necessary against the out of state
mortgagor to satisfy the debt, a declaratory judgment has the
potential of giving plaintiff the chattel while avoiding the jur-
isdictional question in a foreclosure suit, and a possible suit for
wrongful conversion from a claim and delivery proceeding. In
the broader analysis, a declaratory judgment to determine the
priority of mortgages should be recognized as a speedy, inex-
pensive, and safe method by which counsel can adjudicate these
types of controversies.
JoHN H. Lumr.uw, JR.
21. Bing v. GMAC, 237 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.S.C. 1965); 14 C.J.S. Chattel
Mortgages § 176 (1939).
22. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2012 (1962).
23. Transcript of Record at 4, Bank of Augusta v. Satcher Motor Co., 249
S.C. 53, 152 S.E.2d 676 (1967).
24. Bank of Augusta v. Satcher Motor Co., 249 S.C. 53, 60, 152 S.E.2d 676,
679 (1967).
[Vrol. 19
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CIVIL RIGHTS-Right of Teacher to Protest Without Dis-
missal-Public school teacher's activities in leading demonstra-
tions advocating desegregation are constitutionally protected
rights and can form no valid basis for discharge from her teach-
ing position. Rackiey v. School District Number 5 (D.S.C.
1966).
The Negro plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a pub-
lic school teacher until her dismissal in October, 1963. The
plaintiff's dismissal was based on a recommendation submitted
by the superintendent to the school board, setting forth as the
grounds for discharge the plaintiff's participation in certain
civil rights activities. These activities included the following:
(1) leading one civil rights demonstration, (2) being arrested
for trespass during other demonstrations in Charleston and
Orangeburg, South Carolina and (3) being arrested for dis-
tributing protest pamphlets in violation of an Orangeburg city
ordinance. It was conceded by the defendant that the plaintiff's
performance as a classroom teacher was excellent. The action of
the school board in discharging the plaintiff was found to be
based solely on her civil rights activities and the arrests which
resulted therefrom. Moreover, she was not offered employment
in the years following her dismissal.
The plaintiff brought suit in equity praying for preliminary
and permanent injunctions against the defendant from refusing
to reinstate her to her teaching position because she had taken
part in constitutionally protected activity. She also sought to
enjoin the defendant from withholding from her all salaries, ex-
penses and emoluments to which she was rightfully entitled.
The United States District Court for the District of South Caro-
lina, held, judgment for the plaintiff. The fact that a teacher
was a leader in the desegregation movement and had been
arrested for trespass and for distributing handbills in violation
of a city ordinance was not good and sufficient reason for dis-
charging her, because such discharge was based on illegal and
unconstitutionally proscribed conditions and was an unwarranted
and discriminatory exercise of the school board's discretionary
power. Raceley v. School Distict Number 5, 258 F. Supp. 676
(D.S.C. 1966).
1967]
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After dealing with the matter of jurisdiction,1 the court con-
fronted the primary issue concerning whether the defendant
school board in exercising its discretion was justified in dismiss-
ing the plaintiff and refusing to offer her employment as a
teacher in subsequent school years. In South Carolina, school
boards of trustees derive their authority from a statute2 provid-
ing that they may use their discretion in hiring and discharging
teachers, but that discharge of a teacher must be based on good
and sufficient reasons. At first glance the outcome of Racidey
might seem to be a substitution of the court's judgment for that
of the school board, thus depriving the local authorities of the
discretionary powers granted to them by law. A closer analysis,
however, will reveal that no such sweeping substitution has
occurred.
The courts have recognized that school authorities have a duty
to scrutinize teachers to insure their competence and suitability.8
In determining the qualifications of public school teachers,
school administrators and school boards must review a broad
range of factors, and classroom conduct is not the sole basis for
determining fitness.4 The fact that the employer of public
school teachers is the state rather than a private employer does
not prevent an inquiry into past as well as present fitness to
determine suitability for public service.5 Therefore, it is recog-
nized that school boards must be afforded wide discretion in
selecting and evaluating public school teachers. Such discretion,
however, cannot be exercised so arbitrarily as to deprive persons
of their constitutional rights; it must not be exercised in an
arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory manner.0 "[The discre-
tion exercised by the school boards must be within reasonable
limits so as not to curtail, impinge or infringe upon the freedom
1. Jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3) ; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983,
1985; and, U.S. CoNsT. amends, I, V, XIII, XIV, XV. Exhaustion of state
remedies is not a prerequisite to bringing suit in federal court where federal
rights are involved, especially where state remedies appear inadequate or inef-
fective. McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-230(2) (1962).
3. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
4. Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958) ; Adler v. Board of Educ.,
342 U.S. 485 (1952).
5. Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
6. Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1003 (1967) ; Franklin v. County School Bd., 360 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1966).
[Vol. 19
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of political expression or association, or any other constitu-
tionally protected rights."
7
In Rack7ey the court analyzed the grounds upon which the
school board acted in discharging the plaintiff and refusing to
reemploy her and concluded that those activities were an expres-
sion of rights granted to the plaintiff by the United States Con-
stitutions and the Civil Rights Act of 1961.9 They could not
serve as a valid basis for the school board's action. The illegality
of the plaintiff's activities was negated by showing that these
activities were protected by the "laws of the land."10
In Johnson v. Branch," a case factually very similar to Raok-
ley, the plaintiff was a well qualified Negro teacher who was
refused reemployment after twelve years of satisfactory per-
formance. The grounds upon which this refusal was based con-
sisted of alleged minor infractions of school rules, all of which
had been explained and corrected to the satisfaction of the plain-
tiff's superior. The court held that these alleged infractions
were not sufficient justification for the school board's failure
to renew the plaintiff's contract. The court ordered the plain-
tiff's contract renewed and stated that the only reasonable infer-
ence to be drawn from the school board's action was that it was
based on objection to the plaintiff's racial activity.
In Williams v. Sumter School Dist. Number 212 the school
board failed to renew the plaintiff's teaching contract after she
had taught in the school system for ten years and had been
classified as an excellent teacher. The school board did not
specify on what grounds they refused to renew her contract but
7. Rackley v. School Dist. Number 5, 258 F. Supp. 676, 684 (D.S.C. 1966).
8. U.S. CoNsT. amends. I, III, V, XIII, XIV, XV.
9. 78 Stat. 241-268, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h(6) (1964).
10. (a) Ground 1 dealt with a demonstration led by plaintiff which resulted
in a "breach of the peace" conviction. The court noted that the fourteenth
amendment of the Constitution does not permit a state to make criminal the
peaceful expression of unpopular views. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S.
229 (1963).
(b) Ground 2 dealt with arrests for trespass during "sit-in" demonstrations.
These convictions were on appeal when the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was signed
into law and the convictions were thus abated by substituting a right for a
crime. Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
(c) Ground 3 concerned an arrest for distributing handbills in violation of a
city ordinance. While not passing on the constitutionality of the ordinance, the
court stated that if the ordinance was broad enough to cover plaintiff's activity,
it was probably unconstitutional. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
11. 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966).
12. 255 F. Supp. 397 (D.S.C. 1966).
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the court found that it was obvious from the evidence that the
plaintiff was denied reemployment because of her civil rights
activities. The court held the school board's action to be "arbi-
trary, capricious, without constitutional foundation, and beyond
constitutional authority."13
In Willians, the defendant cited in support of the school
board's action the case of Bradford v. School Dist. Number
00.14 In Bradford, however, the plaintiff was arrested for pub-
lic drunkenness and assaulting an officer. He was dismissed
from his teaching position because of this misconduct. The
court upheld the action of the school board as a valid exercise
of its statutory duty.
By comparing Bradford with the cases previously cited, a line
of distinction can be drawn between conduct which will justify
dismissal of a teacher as a valid exercise of the school board's
discretion and conduct which will not serve as a basis for dis-
missal because it is a constitutionally protected activity. Arrests
for genuine misconduct can serve as a basis for dismissal; arrests
for activity which is protected by the Federal Constitution and
the statutes of the United States cannot be used as grounds for
dismissal. Therefore, as was previously stated, the decision in
Rackley does not usurp the discretionary powers of school
boards. It is merely a recognition that their discretion must be
exercised in a reasonable and nondiscriminatory manner so that
it does not deprive any person of his constitutionally guaranteed
rights.",
Wnirx. L. BETHEA, JR.
13. Id. at 403.
14. 364 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1966).
15. See also Chambers v. Hendersonville City Board of Educ., 364 F.2d 189
(4th Cir. 1966); Brooks v. School Dist., 267 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 894 (1959).
[Vol. 19
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Self-incrimination-An attorney in
a disbarment proceeding has a privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Spevack v. Klein (Sup. Ct. 1967).
The petitioner, a member of the New York Bar, refused to
testify or produce requested financial records and papers at a
judicial inquiry investigating his professional conduct. The
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, rejected the peti-
tioner's claim of privilege against self-incrimination under the
fifth amendment and ordered that he be disbarred.1 The order
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of New York.2 On appeal
to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. An attorney
has a privilege against self-incrimination in disbarment proceed-
ings and his refusal to give testimony or produce financial rec-
ords is not a ground for disbarment. Spevac v. Klein, 87 S. Ct.
625 (1967). (5-to-4).
This decision directly overrules Cohen v. Hurley which was
decided on a similar set of facts in 1961.3 In that case the de-
fendant attorney invoked the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion granted by the New York Constitution,4 and refused to
produce the required records or give testimony concerning the
conduct of his practice. In Cohen, as in the present case, the
theory upon which the defense was rejected by the trial court
was not that an attorney is denied the privilege, but that by
refusing to testify, he fails in his obligation to inform the court
of matters concerning his professional ethics and integrity.5 The
Supreme Court in Cohen ruled that the State of New York
could use an attorney's refusal to testify as a ground for disbar-
ment without violating the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The state was therefore allowed to determine its
own brand of due process and to exclude an attorney from its
protection in disbarment proceedings largely because of the rela-
tionship between the lawyer and the state which allows him to
practice.0 Although not using it as a basis for its decision, the
1. It re Spevack, 24 App. Div. 2d 653, 16 N.Y.2d 1048 (1965).
2. Klein v. Spevack, 16 N.Y.2d 1048, 213 N.E.2d 457, 266 N.Y.S.2d 126
(1965). See also Klein v. Spevack, 17 N.Y2d 490, 214 N.E2d 373, 267
N.Y.S2d 210 (1966).
3. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961).
4. N.Y. CONST. art I, § 6.
5. In re Cohen, 9 App. Div. 2d 436, 448, 195 N.Y.S2d 990, 1003 (1959).
6. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 125-27 (1961).
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court further stated that the fourteenth amendment did not
extend to the petitioner a federal privilege against self-incrimi-
nation7 based on the ruling in Twining v. New Jersey" and those
cases which have upheld its premise.9
In 1964 this interpretation of the relationship between the
fifth and the fourteenth amendments was reversed in the lead-
ing case of Malloy v. Hogan.10 There the Court unequivocally
held that the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment
is made applicable to the states by the fourteenth. The Court
in Malloy v. Hogan did not expressly overrule Cohen but stated
that its foundation was no longer sound." The appellate
division, in ordering that the petitioner Spevack be disbarred,
distinguished Malloy because there the defendant was not an
attorney. The court of appeals affirmed without distinguish-
ing Malloy, and based its decision directly on Cohen, and on the
further ground that since the records sought to be produced
were required by law to be kept,12 the privilege did not apply
to them under the holding in Shapiro v. United States.'3
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court reiterated the
principle expressed in Malloy that the self-incrimination clause
of the fifth amendment is absorbed by the fourteenth and
thereby applied to the states. From this base the Court held that
this privilege is now extended to attorneys in state disciplinary
proceedings so that no state can force an attorney to choose
between the right to remain silent and the consequence of possi-
ble disbarment if he does so. Such action by the state weakens
the fifth amendment privilege and imposes an unlawful penalty
for its use. Just what constitutes an unlawful penalty was dis-
cussed in Griffin v. California, and defined as any sanction
which makes invocation of the privilege "costly.' 4 The loss of
reputation and livelihood associated with disbarment was ruled
to be clearly within that definition. Therefore, an attorney's
7. Id. at 127-28.
8. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
9. E.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319 (1937).
10. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
11. Id. at 11.
12. See N.Y. Crv. PRAc. ANNUAL, 9-24 (1964) cited in Spevack v. Klein,
87 S. Ct. 625, 629 n.4 (1967).
13. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
14. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
[Vol. 19
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failure to testify can no longer be used as a ground for disbar-
ment. The court of appeals' second ground for affirmance, i.e.,
that the privilege was not applicable to the records in the first
place, was dismissed as an improper ground since the order
rendered by the lower court was not based on that contention.
The holding in Spevaclo v. Kein is specific in its application
to attorneys and those not employed by the state. The question
of whether policemen, state accountants, and others of this cate-
gory can be dismissed for refusing to testify regarding the
conduct of their affairs was specifically reserved.15
C. E. MCDoNALD, JR.
15. Spevack v. Klein, 87 S. Ct. 625, 629 n.3 (1967).
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Conditions of Probation-A court
does not have authority to condition the probation of a defendant
convicted of assault with a deadly weapon on his payment of a
pre-existing debt to a credit card company. People v. -Williams
(Cal. Ct. App. 1966).
When the defendant tried to make a purchase on his Diners'
Club card, the proprietor of the store refused to return the card
because it appeared on the club's blacklist. The defendant then
struck the proprietor and assaulted him with a pair of scissors.
Arrest and conviction followed and the defendant was sentenced
to prison with execution of the sentence suspended. He was
placed on probation for five years with nominal supervision on
condition that he serve one year in the county jail and make
restitution of the amount he owed to the Diners' Club within
eighteen months after his release from jail.
The defendant's sole contention on appeal was that the condi-
tion of probation which provided for restitution to the Diners'
Club was void because it violated the state constitutional prohi-
bition on imprisonment for debt and denied the defendant due
process of law. Although it refused to sustain the defendant's
constitutional objections, the California Court of Appeal, held,
the condition did exceed the scope of that authorized by law, and
the case was remanded for review of the matter of probation.
PeopZe v. Williams, 55 Cal. Rptr. 550 (Ct. App. 1966).
In dismissing the defendant's constitutional objections, the
court explained that if the sentence were executed it would be
for the aggravated assault and not imprisonment for failure to
pay the debt.
On several occasions the California courts, in upholding rep-
arative conditions of probation, have suggested that the court
is not limited to the transactions or amounts involved in the
crimes for which the defendant is actually convicted.1 They
have also held it proper to provide that the defendant be able
to pay any civil judgment which the victim of his assault might
recover against him.2 The broad language of the California
statute which deals with the conditions of probation provides
that "[t]he court may impose . . .reasonable conditions, as it
1. Ex parte Trombley, 31 Cal. 2d 801, 193 P.2d 734 (1948) ; People v. Lipp-
ner, 219 Cal. 395, 26 P.2d 457 (1933) ; People v. Flores, 197 Cal. App. 2d 611,
17 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1961).
2. People v. D'Elia, 73 CaL App. 2d 764, 167 P.2d 253 (1946).
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may determine are fitting and proper to the end ... that amends
may be made . . . for any injury done to any person resulting
from such breach [of the law]." 3
In California the objection that the condition is unreasonable
or beyond the power of the court has been generally overruled.
This is well illustrated by People v. Blankenship4, a statutory
rape case in which the twenty-three year old defendant, who was
infected with a communicable venereal disease, was granted pro-
bation on the condition that he submit to sterilization. In up-
holding such conditions as neither unreasonable nor improper,
the courts have adopted the following principle:
The granting of probation is entirely within the sound dis-
cretion of the trial court; a defendant has no right to pro-
bation; he does have the right, if he feels that the terms of
probation are more harsh than the sentence imposed by
law, to refuse probation and undergo such sentence.;
However, Blankenship was not followed by a lower court in
the recent case of I re Hernandez.6 The twenty-one year old
defendant was convicted of being in a place where narcotics
were in use. Obviously influenced by information that the
defendant was living with a man to whom she was not mar-
ried and was receiving welfare payments for their illegitimate
child, the municipal court granted probation on the condition
that she submit to sterilization. The reviewing court deleted the
requirement of sterilization from the probation order. It com-
mented that although the judge has broad discretion in these
matters he should not abuse it by imposing conditions that are
"arbitrary and capricious and not related to the nature and grav-
ity of the offense and which are not designed to accomplish the
objects of probation."7
Other courts have not hesitated to strike down the following
conditions of probation: that the defendant donate a pint of
3. People v. Williams, 55 Cal. Rptr. 550, 555 (Ct. App. 1966) quoting from
CA.. PENAL CODE- § 1203.1 (Supp. 1966).
4. 16 Cal. App. 2d 606, 61 P.2d 352 (1936).
5. People v. Osslo, 50 Cal. 2d 75, 103, 323 P.2d 397, 413, cert. denied, 357
U.S. 907 (1958).
6. No. 76757 (Cal. Super. Ct, Santa Barbara County, June 8, 1966); dis-
cussed in Note, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, 67 COLUm. L. Ry.
181 (1967).
7. In re Hernandez, No. 76757,7 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Barbara County,
June 8, 1966).
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blood to the Red Cross ;8 that the defendant post an appearance
bond ;9 that the defendant write an essay satisfactory to the judge
setting forth reasons why the police department should be en-
titled to the respect of the citizenry.10
There are some suggestions that a proceeding may not be used
as a vehicle for imposing restitution or reparation for obligations
which may be related to, but not directly attributable to, the
principal offense. Under the Federal Probation Act,11 restitu-
tion or reparation is limited to those aggrieved by, and to the
amount involved in, the offense.12 Similarly, a New York court
has concluded that "[playment of a civil debt cannot be required
as a condition of probation."' 3 Perhaps the Colorado court has
given the best expression to the idea: "Either the applicant is a
worthy risk for probation or he is not. If he is worthy, his
release on probation should not be weighted with terms and con-
ditions having nothing to do with the purpose and policy of
probation laws. 1
After distinguishing the Federal and New York cases because
of the restrictive statutes involved, the Wisconsin court distilled
from other cases the rule "that the damages must be directly
caused by the acts for which the defendant was convicted, and
the amount of the restitution must be reasonable."' 5  In that
case it was held error for the court to require restitution for
thefts occurring during a period not charged in the information.
In Vermont, where the statute contained no provision ex-
pressly authorizing or restricting restitution or reparation, 6
the court concluded in State v. Barnett' 7 that the restitution
conditions for probation had to be for loss sustained as a direct
result of the specific crime for which the defendant was convicted.
8. Springer v. United States, 148 F2d 411 (9th Cir. 1945).
9. Logan v. People, 138 Colo. 304, 322 P.2d 897 (1958).
10. Butler v. District of Columbia, 346 F2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1964). See also Annot, 97 A.L.R2d 798 (1964).
12. Karrel v. United States, 181 F.2d 981 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
891 (1950).
13. People v. Marx, 19 App. Div. 2d 577, 240 N.Y.S2d 232, 234 (1963).
14. Logan v. People, 138 Colo. 304, 308, 1332 P.2d 897, 900 (1958).
15. State v. Scherr, 9 Wis. 2d 418, 424, 101 N.W2d 77, 81 (1960).
16. The South Carolina statute is similar in that it authorizes the court to
include any conditions of probation that it may choose. S.C. CODE AwN. § 55-
593 (1962).
17. 110 Vt 221, 3 A.2d 521 (1939).
[Vol. 19
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In overruling a prior decision 18 dealing with the same factual
situation-the imposition of a condition of restitution on a hit
and run driver-the Michigan court acknowledged that probation
gives the defendant an alternative. But the court suggested that
it may not be lawful to give him an alternative which would
determine his civil liability without the benefit of a hearing with
all of its constitutional safeguards. 19
The California statute uses the term "reparation" which is
widely recognized to be broader than more restitution as used in
most of the other statutes. Restitution usually is considered to be
reimbursement of a sum of money -which the defendant appro-
priated in the commission of his crime, while reparation is nor-
mally deemed to synonymous with tort damages.20
After considering many of the above cases, the Williams court
concluded that the trial court did not have the authority to
impose this particular condition but that "there should be no
hard and fast rule that money payments as a condition of proba-
tion be limited to the direct consequences of the particular crime
of which respondent stands convicted."
2'
On the basis of this case and other recent decisions, California
appears to be narrowing its view of permissable probation con-
ditions to a standard more closely in line with the majority of
the courts in this country.
WMrTAM PATEWO
18. People v. Good, 287 Mich. 110, 282 N.W. 920 (1938).
19. People v. Becker, 349 Mich. 476, 84 N.W.2d 833 (1957).
20. See Best & Birzon, Conditions of Probation: An Analysis, 51 GEo. L.J.
809 (1963).
21. 55 Cal. Rptr. 550, 559 (Ct App. 1966).
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Right of Indigent to Services of
Expert Witness-An indigent defendant has a constitutional
right to a reasonable fee for the purpose of hiring an expert
witness for his defense. People v. Watson (Ill. 1966).
The defendant, an indigent, having been indicted for attempt
to commit forgery, filed a pre-trial motion requesting funds for
the purpose of hiring a document examiner to make handwriting
comparisons and deliver expert testimony at trial. The court
denied this motion, and the ensuing jury trial ended in a verdict
of guilty. Facing a five-year prison sentence, defendant ap-
pealed, and the Illinois Supreme Court, held, the defendant had
a constitutional right to be allotted a reasonable fee with which
to hire the services of a document examiner as an expert witness.
People v. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966).
Article II, section 9 of the Illinois Constitution comports with
the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution in that
it provides a defendant with "compulsory process" for obtaining
witnesses in his favor. This provision has been extended to en-
compass payment by the government of necessary expenses, when
the defendant "proves that he is poor, and unable to bear the
expense himself."'
'Watson and a few federal district court cases2 have gone a step
further, requiring governmental payment of what might be
termed "professional fees."
The value of an expert witness's testimony lies in his experi-
ence and, more particularly, in his preparation. Although
a subpoena would suffice to compel his appearance at trial,
this appearance by itself would be of no value unless he had
been able to make findings upon which to base his testimony.3
It was the cost of these preparatory findings that the Watson
court felt should be borne by the government.4
In support of its finding in Watson, the court referred to the
long standing judicial goal of insuring for all criminal defend-
ants "equality before the bar of justice in every American court." 5
1. United States v. Kenneally, 26 F. Cas. 760 (No. 15,522) (N.D. Ill. 1870).
2. Willis v. United States, 285 F.2d 663 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (dictum) ; United
States v. Fox, 19 F. Supp. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1937). But see United States v.
Wentland, 234 F. Supp. 936 (D.D.C. 1964).
3. People v. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645, 648 (1966).
4. People v. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966).
5. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940).
[Vol. 19
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As indicative of this goal the court cited Gideon v. WainwrightO
and Griffin v. Rhinois.7
In Griffin the Court determined that the denial of appellate
review solely because the defendant was unable to pay for a
transcript of the trial constituted a denial of due process.
In criminal trials a state can no more discriminate on ac-
count of poverty than on account of religion, race or color.
Plainly the ability to pay costs in advance bears no rational
relationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence and could not
be used as an excuse to deprive a defendant of a fair trial.8
Just as Griffin secured the right of appellate review for the
indigent defendant in state courts, Gideon provided him with
the right to counsel-overruling Betts v. Brady,9 while bring-
ing the sixth amendment's right to counsel provision to bear
upon the states.10
In reality, Griffin, Gideon, Watson, and Douglas v. Cali-
fornia" (extending right to counsel to the appellate level) form
part of a larger scheme, characterized by "the increased concern
over insuring equal justice for the indigent accused."'21 This
movement, which Mr. Justice Clark once called "this new fetish
for indigency..., 13 has advanced with force and rapidity. Indic-
ative of this rapidity is the fact that a federal appellate court, in
1951, expressed "great difficulty" in accepting a line of reasoning
that might eventually require that expert witnesses be made
available to the indigent accused.14 As recently as ten years ago
a study intimated that such an idea was still considered "start-
ling. 151
Despite such skepticism ten and fifteen years ago, it now seems
reasonable to predict that some day the expert witness rule will
acquire general application. In this event, manifold problems
6. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
7. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
8. Id. at 17-18.
9. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
10. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
11. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
12. Koplovitz, New Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
2 CIm. L. BuLr., May, 1966 at 7.
13. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 359 (dissenting opinion) (1963).
14. United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540, 547 (3d Cir. 1951).
15. Allen, Griffin v. Illinois: Antecedents and Aftermath, 25 U. CH. L. RFv.
151, 157 (1957).
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might arise: Will the defendant's failure to file a motion for
appointment of an expert witness prior to trial constitute a
waiver? 6 Will the expert witness requirement be given retro-
active effect?' 7 Can a workable system be devised by which
convicted indigents would reimburse the state?"'
Perhaps the most serious problem that general application of
the expert witness rule might create is that of frivolous appeals.
A recent study has revealed that "the most widely felt abuse of
the assignment system is the false claim of indigency to obtain
free counsel."' Mr. Justice Clark, dissenting in Douglas, re-
ferred to "the overwhelming percentage of in forma pauperis
appeals" as frivolous. 20 One survey, however, related that most
of those defendants who had obtained assigned counsel were
actually indigent.21 It might be inferred from these reports that
there are effective screening systems in operation. Some of the
operative systems include: (1) extensive probing into the back-
ground and activities of the accused, 22 (2) affidavits under
oath,23 (3) and inquiries into the defendant's source of bail.24
Many jurisdictions, believing assignment of counsel to be less
costly than extensive investigations into claims of indigency,
assign counsel automatically and handle frivolous appeals on the
appellate level.25 Which of these and other methods to adopt,
discard, or combine, presents a future challenge.
Once indigeney has been established, what additional condi-
tions will be required in order to induce application of the expert
witness rule? Although Tatson repudiated the capital crime
16. Cf. Adargo v. People, 411 P.2d 245 (Colo. 1966).
17. See Allen, Griffin v. Illinois: Antecedents and Aftermath, 25 U. Cm. L.
REv. 151 (1957).
18. Cf. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 238 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1965).
19. Note, The Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in the Federal
District Courts, 76 HAIv. L. REv. 579, 585 (1963).
20. 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
21. L. HALL & Y. KAWxsA., MODERN CRIMNAL PROCaURE 297 (2d ed. 1966)
[citing Jr. Bar Sec. of Bar Ass'n. of the District of Columbia, Report of Com-
mittee on Standards of Indigency 31 (1963).]
22. Note, The Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in the Federal
District Courts, 76 HA~v. L. Rlv. 579, 586 (1963).
23. Id.
24. Id. See also Note, Legal Aid to Indigent Criminal Defendants in Phila-
delphia and New Jersey, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 812, 832 (1959).
25. Note, The Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in the Federal
District Courts, 76 HARv. L. REv. 579, 585-86 (1963).
[Vol. 19
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distinction as the dividing line,20 it is still possible that the de-
gree of seriousness of the charge may determine whether or not
the rule will apply. Imposition of a verbal standard, however,
may allow greater flexibility. For example, the federal rule that
allows an indigent criminal defendant to summon a witness at
government expense if the witness is "necessary to an adequate
defense"27 could apply equally well to the summoning of expert
witnesses. In Watson the court remarked, "whether it is neces-
sary to subpoena expert witnesses in order to assure fair trial
will depend upon the facts in each case."2 8 Such language leaves
the question entirely open, projecting a challenge for future
litigation.
DAN T. BaAT Rsonn
26. 36 Ill. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645, 649 (1966).
27. FFD. 1. Cm. P. 17(b).
28. 36 Ill. 2d 228, 221 N.E2d 645, 648 (1966).
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Sixth Amendment Right to Speedy
Trial Applied to the States Through Fourteenth Amendment.-
A state's indefinitely postponing prosecution on an indictment
without stated justification over the objection of an accused who
has been discharged from custody is a violation of the right to
a speedy trial which is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
sixth amendment. Kopfer v. North Carolina (Sup. Ct. 1967).
Following his 1964 trial for criminal trespass, in which the
jury was unable to reach a verdict, the petitioner was informed
by the state's solicitor that he intended to have a nolle prosegui
with leave1 entered in the case. The petitioner objected to the
entry in open court. Thereafter, the solicitor declined to move
for a nole prosegui with leave; instead he moved for a contin-
uance of the case, which was granted.
In the August term the Klopfer case was not listed and the
petitioner filed a motion expressing his desire to have the charge
pending against him "permanently concluded in accordance with
the applicable laws of the State of North Carolina and of the
United States as soon as reasonably possible."2 The solicitor
then moved, without stating a justification for the proposed en-
try, that the state be permitted to take a %olle prosegui with
leave, which was granted. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina held that the discretion of the solicitor and the
court was not reviewable under the facts disclosed.3 The peti-
tioner then appealed to the United States Supreme Court con-
tending that the entry of the nolle prosegui with leave order de-
prived him of his right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.
In granting the petitioner relief the Supreme Court, held, a
state's indefinitely postponing prosecution on an indictment
without stated justification over the objection of an accused who
has been discharged from custody is a violation of the right to a
speedy trial which is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
sixth amendment. EMop/er v. North Carolina, 87 S. Ct. 988
(1967).
1. A nolle prosequid with leave is an unusual North Carolina criminal proce-
dural device; and if the case is olle prosequi with leave, "the consent required
to reinstate the prosecution at a future date is implied in the order, 'and the
solicitor (without further order) may have the case restored for trial'." Klop-
fer v. North Carolina, 87 S. Ct. 988, 989 (1967).
2. Id. at 991.
3. State v. Klopfer, 266 N.C. 349, 145 S.E.2d 909 (1966).
[Vol. 19
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It is not surprising that the Supreme Court should apply the
sixth amendment requirement of speedy trial to the states. The
Court has previously applied other sixth amendment rights to the
states, including the right to counsel 4 and right of an accused
to confront witnesses against him.5 In Kiopfer the Court held
that the requirement of a speedy trial is as fundamental as any
of the other rights secured by the sixth amendment and is thus
applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment.6
Such a holding raises problems of determining to what extent
this action by the Court will affect the policies and procedures
of the states in criminal cases, and at what points are the crimi-
nal procedures of the federal government and the state govern-
ments at variance. The federal courts have held, up to this time,
that the right to speedy trial is relative and is consistent with
delays; and whether the delay amounts to an unconstitutional
deprivation of rights depends upon the circumstances of the case
involved.7 The state courts have adhered to this view.8
While the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure9 and the fed-
eral courts have not clearly specified what circimstances will
cause the dismissal of a case for denial of a speedy trial, the
courts have pointed out factors which will be used in making a
determination. In United States v. Simmons' ° the court held
that a delay in prosecution which may be prejudicial to the de-
fendant is that which is purposeful or oppressive and caused by
deliberate acts of government. In applying this criteria the
court considers the length of the delay, the reason for the delay,
the prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay, and whether
the defendant has waived his right to a speedy trial. In United
States v. Ewell" the Court, in explaining the purpose of the
sixth amendment, said the sixth amendment "guarantee is an im-
portant safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration
prior to trial, to mi-nimize anxiety and concern accompanying
4. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
5. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
6. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 87 S. Ct 988, 993 (1967).
7. See United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966); United States v.
Simmons, 338 F2d 804, 806 (2d Cir. 1964).
8. E.g., Casias v. People, 415 P.2d 344 (Colo. 1966) ; Jones v. State, 241 Md.
599, 217 A.2d 367 (1966); Wheeler v. State, 247 S.C. 393, 400, 147 S.E2d
627, 630 (1966).
9. FED. R. Csmi. P. 48(b).
10. 338 F.2d 804, 807 (2d Cir. 1964).
11. 383 U.S. 116 (1966).
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public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay
will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself."' 2
Today almost every state has both constitutional and statutory
provisions which guarantee the right to speedy trial. The con-
stitutional provisions are usually applicable to the entire process
of the prosecution, while the statutes cover only the period be-
tween the indictment or commitment and the commencement of
the trial.' States, by use of the statutory period, have been
able to circumvent the constitutional issue of denial of speedy
trial, except in cases involving prolonged delays.14 In applying
these statutes, courts "treat the passage of the statutory period
as conclusive of undue delay, thus requiring them to dismiss the
charge if all other conditions are met."' 5 It is doubtful whether
this procedure of the states will come under attack by the federal
courts. In all probability, the federal courts will be concerned
with those situations which they determine to be oppressive and
prejudicial to the defendant, with each case standing on its own
merits.
However, other problems dealing with statutory dismissal may
arise. The states have taken three different positions on the use
of statutory dismissals.
One group of states treats it as a bar to another prosecution
for the same offense, while another group does not. The
third position is that such a dismissal prevents subsequent
prosecution for the same charge if it is a misdemeanor, but
not if it is a felony .... In resolving this ambiguity, courts
have relied on either of two opposing policy considerations.
Those barring subsequent prosecutions stress the importance
of speedy trial and the need for a potent sanction to enforce
it. The opposing view emphasizes the need for effective
prosecution of criminal cases.16
The United States Supreme Court has taken the latter view
in construing a District of Columbia statute.' 7 But with the
12. Id. at 120.
13. Note, The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 CoLurm. L. REv. 846,
847-48 (1957); see e.g., Jacobson v. Winter, 415 P.2d 297 (Idaho 1966);
People v. Rogers, 70 IIl. App. 2d 474, 217 N.E.2d 344 (1966).
14. 57 COLUmt. L. REv., supra note 13, at 848. See also People v. Stuckey,
34 Ill. 2d 521, 216 N.E.2d 785 (1966).
15. 57 CoLuzm. L. Rav., supra note 13 at 852.
16. Id. at 859-60.
17. United States v. Cadaar, 197 U.S. 475 (1905).
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change of attitude of the Court, as shown in lopfer, it would
appear that the court will strike down those provisions which
allow another trial of an accused after the first one has been dis-
missed if it will "indefinitely" prolong his oppression as well as
his anxiety and his concern over public accusation.""
In dealing with the length of delay as a factor to be taken into
consideration, the court held in Shepherd v. United States10
that the right to a speedy trial does not require a trial to be held
immediately upon the return of an indictment, nor an arrest
made under it, but it does require that the trial shall be had as
soon as reasonably possible. In United States V. Sanchez20 the
officer waited fourteen months before making the arrest. The
court, in holding that it did not deprive the defendant of his
constitutional right to a speedy trial, stated that a pre-arrest
delay may deprive the defendant of a constitutional right if a
showing is made that the delay was prejudicial, or part of a de-
liberate, purposeful and oppressive design for delay. It is doubt-
ful that the Supreme Court will attempt to set a specifl time
as to when a trial must be had. Such a limitation, if imposed,
would raise problems since each state's term of court lasts for a
different length of time.
A noZe prosegui, unlike an acquittal, does not free the accused
from further prosecution for the offense charged, and it will not
be a bar to a second indictment covering the same crime.21 In
Klopfer the Court did not rule out the use of a noZle prosegui
in all criminal actions. While the Court indicated that the man-
ner in which the nolle prosequi was applied in this particular
case was unconstitutional, it appeared to approve of the methods
of its application and uses in other states.
22
The right to a speedy trial, which is a constitutional right as
opposed to a statutory one, is a relative concept and it would be
difficult to give it a precise definition. While Klopfer has ex-
18. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 87 S. Ct. 988, 993 (1967).
19. 163 F.2d 974, 976 (8th Cir. 1947). See, e.g., Morland v. United States,
193 F2d 297, 298 (10th Cir. 1951), where delay in bringing defendant to trial
on federal charges was due to the fact that he had not been apprehended and
had been incarcerated in a state penitentiary. See also Note, Dismissal of the
Indictment as a Remedy for Denial of the Right to a Speedy Trial, 64 YALE
L.J. 1208, 1215 (1955).
20. 361 F.2d 824, 825 (2d Cir. 1966). But see Ross v. United States, 349
F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
21. See United States v. Fox, 130 F2d 56, 58 (3d Cir. 1942).
22. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 87 S. Ct. 988, 991-92 (1967).
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tended this right to the states, the Court has never said just what
procedures will be held to be violative of it. Since the methods
that many of the states have used in applying this right are con-
sistent with those of the federal courts, it would appear that the
states should not show any great concern about this decision. The
states, in the past, have also viewed this right as a fundamental
one inherent in our system of justice and have not ignored or
minimized it as they have other rights which have now been
extended protection from infringement by the states. The Court,
in applying the sixth amendment right of speedy trial to the
states, has taken another step toward applying the Bill of
Rights, in its entirety, to the states.
STA =.LE APP mAu[
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE- Self-incrimination - Comment at
trial on the defendant's refusal to speak for voice identification
is inadmissable when the fifth amendment warning does not
distinguish between speech in terms of communication and speech
for voice identification. People v. Ellis (Cal. 1966).
The defendant-appellant was arrested and charged with as-
sault with intent to commit rape. Police officers warned the
defendant that he had a right to remain silent and that anything
he said could be used against him. The victim indicated that she
could identify her assailant's voice. She was placed in a room
next to that occupied by the defendant and several officers. The
defendant was asked to repeat phrases recited by the officers. He
refused to cooperate and remained silent. At the trial police
officers testified that the defendant had refused to participate in
the voice identification test. The defendant was convicted of
assault with intent to commit rape. On appeal the defendant
contended that introduction of evidence of his refusal to partici-
pate in the voice identification test violated his constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court of
California, held, reversed. If after police officers have warned
the defendant of his right to remain silent and the fact that any-
thing he says may be used against him they desire to have the
defendant speak for voice identification purposes and he refuses,
they must, as a prerequisite to the use of the defendant's refusal
to speak as evidence of consciousness of guilt, advise him that
the right to remain silent does not include the right to refuse to
participate in such a test. People v. Ellis, 421 P. 2d 393, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 385 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
In 1964, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the
protection afforded by the self-incrimination privilege (herein-
after referred to as the privilege) of the fifth amendment ap-
plied equally to both state and federal governments.' Two years
later, in Schmerber 'v. Calif ornia,2 the Court indicated its con-
ception of the privilege: "[T]he privilege [against self-incrimina-
tion] protects an accused only from being compelled to testify
against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of
a testimonial or communicative nature... ." Previously, the test
most frequently used in this area had been Professor Wigmore's
1. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
2. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
3. Id. at 761.
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formulation, distinguishing between testimonial evidence and
real or physical evidence.4 The Court said that it would not
accept this distinction as more than "a helpful framework for
analysis,'5 thus evidencing an intent to examine each type of
evidence anew to determine whether such evidence is protected.
The principal disadvantage of such an ad hoc application of the
privilege is the lack of predictability it generates in an area in
which some element of predictability is essential. Recent appli-
cations of the privilege by state and lower federal courts have
uniformly determined that voice identifications are not protected
by the privilege.0 It is difficult to see how the Supreme Court
of the United States can fail to be strongly influenced by such
a consistent line of reasoning.
Prior to 1950, only two decisions had dealt with evidence from
voice identification tests as being possibly violative of the privi-
lege.7 One of them, State v. Taylor, was handed down by the
Supreme Court of South Carolina. In Taylor the court held
the evidence from the test inadmissable because "[a]ppellant was
required to repeat certain words which the prosecutrix says were
used by the person who assaulted her. The effect of this was to
require him to partially re-enact the scene." 9 The court assumed,
without deciding, that, had there been no compulsion as to sub-
ject or words to be used, the testimony would have been admis-
sable under the physical evidence theory.10 The court's reason-
ing was sharply criticized by contemporary writers.11 However,
4. 8 J. WIGmoRE, EVmENCE § 2265 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
5. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
6. E.g., Gilbert v. United States, 366 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1966) ; Rigney v.
Hendrick, 355 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1965); cert. denied, 384 U.S. 975 (1966);
Boyer v. State, 182 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1966); State v. Freeman, 195 Kan. 561, 408
P.2d 612 (1965); cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1025 (1966); Dyson v. State, 238
Md. 398, 209 A.2d 609 (1965) motion for reargument denied, 238 Md. 546, 210
A.2d 730 (1965); State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 209 A.2d 110 (1965) writ of
habeas corpits deced, 256 F. Supp. 522 (1966) ; State v. Ramirez, 76 N.M. 72,
412 P.2d 246 (1966); Commonwealth v. Sliva, 202 Pa. Super. 455, 198 A.2d
354 (1964) reV'd on other grounds, 415 Pa. 537, 204 A.2d 455 (1964), affd
on remand, 206 Pa. Super. 745, 213 A.2d 686 (1965).
7. State v. Taylor, 213 S.C. 330, 49 S.E.2d 289 (1948) ; Beachem v. State,
144 Tex. Crim. 272, 162 S.W.2d 706 (1942).
8. 213 S.C. 330, 49 S.E.2d 289 (1948).
9. Id. at 338, 49 S.E.2d at 292.
10. Id.
11. E.g., 24 IND. L.J. 587, 589 (1949); 27 N.C.L. REv. 262, 265 (1949);
97 U. PA. L. REv. 441 (1949).
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under S hmer'ber's testimonial products approach,'12 this situa-
tion could possibly be declared self-incriminating.
The court in Ellis relied on People v. Lopeos" in deciding that
the results of voice identification tests fall within the category
of real, or physical, evidence and, as such, are unprotected by
the privilege.14 Judge Traynor, writing for the court, described
voice identification testimony as "the very type of objective fac-
tual evidence, independent of information communicated by the
accused, that the privilege encourages police to seek."' 5 The court
then queried whether the privilege would be served by an exten-
sion to cover voice identification tests. The conclusion reached
was that important testimony would be excluded from considera-
tion. Such testimony would be essential when visual identifica-
tion is impossible. The court pointed out that "fundamental
principles of fairness and due process are always applicable to
prevent abuse." 16
Having decided that the privilege does not cover voice identi-
fication tests, the court was then forced to consider whether evi-
dence and comment on defendant's refusal to participate in such
a test was admissable. The court said that defendant was not
being penalized for exercising a constitutional privilege, within
the rule of G/iffin v. Califomnia,17 because defendant had no
constitutional right to refuse to speak solely for purposes of voice
identification.' This is evidence of conduct indicating conscious-
ness of guilt which, the court felt, would not come within the
category of testimonial products warned against in Schmer'ber.
The court concluded: "Without exception, none of the reasons
that support the privilege lends support to a rule that would ex-
clude probative evidence obtained from an accused's efforts to
conceal nonprivileged evidence." 19
At this point the dissent (along with most of the other juris-
dictions, state and federal) was in agreement with the court's
reasoning. But here the court extended any previous decision
12. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 n.9 (1966).
13. 384 P2d 16, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1963).
14. People v. Ellis, 421 P.2d 393, 395, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385, 387 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
15. Id.; see Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1964) ; 8 J. WiGmoRE,
EviDENCE § 2251 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). But see R. MORELAND, MODERN
CRImiNAL PROCEDURE 78, 79 (1959).
16. People v. Ellis, 421 P.2d 393, 396, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385, 388 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
17. 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
18. People v. Ellis, 421 P.2d 393, 397, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385, 389 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
19. Id. at 398. 55 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
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in the voice identification area by holding that the fifth amend-
ment warning must distinguish between speech in terms of com-
munication and speech for voice identification, or evidence of an
accused's refusal to participate in such a test will be inadmis-
sable.20 The court reasoned that this distinction "would hardly
occur to a layman unless it was called to his attention. Thus,
defendant's refusal to speak might well have been the direct re-
sult of the police warning and cannot be used against him."
21
The dissent stood directly opposed: "But certainly he cannot
reasonably infer from the mandatory admonition that he may
remain mute thereafter for all purposes."
22
The court's holding will require California officers to adopt yet
another rule of police procedure. Whether it will be "super-
fluous," as the dissent suggests,23 is difficult to predict now. Any
workable rule must strike a common-sense balance between an
accused's privilege not to incriminate himself and the communi-
ty's right to legitimate police investigation, not only to discover
who has perpetuated a crime, but to rule out who has not. There
must be a middle ground in due process that affords fair protec-
tion to an individual against the state without thwarting efforts
of the state to pursue the investigation of crime. The object of
attaining such a position is to bring a pervasive openness to pre-
arraignment procedures in which rules can function with rea-
sonable flexibility instead of as martinets.
While the present era is one of increasing emphasis on defend-
ant's rights, the pendulum may well swing the other way in the
future. It is difficult to foretell whether or not other jurisdic-
tions, or the Supreme Court of the United States, will adopt this
rule as promulgated by the California Supreme Court.
THo3AS EUGENE ALLEN, III
20. Id. at 398, 399, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 390, 391.
21. Id. at 398, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
22. Id. at 401, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 393 (dissenting opinion).
23. Id.
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EVIDENCE--Juvenile Proceedings-The confession of a minor
obtained before warning him of his right to remain silent and
his right to counsel is inadmissible at juvenile court proceedings,
even though such proceedings are not criminal trials. In re
Acuna (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
The appellant, age seventeen, was taken into custody follow-
ing an assault upon an adult, and by a petition filed in the
juvenile court under section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code,1 was charged with a, violation of section 245 of the Penal
Code2 (assault with a deadly weapon). After a hearing at
which he was represented by counsel, the appellant was declared
a ward of the court. He appealed from the judgment of ward-
ship contending that his extrajudicial confession to the assault
was improperly introduced into evidence and that the evidence
was insufficient to support a finding of wardship. The Cali-
fornia District Court of Appeals, Third District, held, judgment
of wardship affirmed. Substantial evidence other than the ap-
pellant's confession, which was excluded because appellant was
not warned of his right to remain silent and right to counsel
prior to the confession, supported the judgment of wardship. In
re Acuna, 53 Cal. IRptr. 884 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
The procedural rules governing juvenile hearings have tradi-
tionally been flexible. This flexibility has been permitted on the
assumption that a juvenile court proceeding is aimed at a protec-
tive, rather than an adversary atmosphere and that the youthful
offender is not to be punished, but rather rehabilitated.3 How-
ever, the California District Court of Appeals, Third District,
rejected this long standing assumption in In re Acuna.4  Al-
though the court affirmed the juvenile court's judgment of ward-
ship, it excluded the extrajudicial confession of the minor from
the wardship hearing on the grounds that it was inadmissible
in light of the rules laid down in Miranda v. Aiizona,5 Escobedo
1. CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 602 (West 1966) which reads:
"Any person under the age of 21 years who violates any law of this state or of
the United States . . . is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which
may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court."
2. CAL. PEN. CoDE § 245 (West Supp. 1966).
3. Note, The California Juvenile Court, 10 STAN. L. RyV. 471, 493 (1958);
see People v. Dotson, 46 Cal. 2d 891, 299 P.2d 875 (1956); see also Note,
Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79
HARV. L. REv. 775 (1966).
4. 53 Cal. Rptr. 884 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
5. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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v. Illinois,G and People v. Dorado.7  Thus In re Acuna marks
a substantial step in the further extension of the constitutional
safeguards, afforded defendants in criminal trials, to juvenile
court proceedings which have long been held to be civil in na-
ture.8 The stride taken by this court is even more notable in
view of the fact that section 503 of the California Welfare and
Institution Code specifically states that a wardship hearing is
not a criminal proceeding.9 This provision of the statute was
enacted after the Supreme Court of California in People v. Dot-
son'O concluded that juvenile court proceedings were not criminal
in nature but guardianship proceedings in which the state acted
as parens patriae, and were not governed by the strict rules that
regulate criminal prosecutions. 1
By applying the rules set forth in Miranda, Escobedo and
Dorado, the court in In re Acuna brought to an apex the con-
troversy over the procedural protection available to minors in
juvenile court hearings which had been evident in the California
courts since the early 1950's.
The first California court to question the flexibility of pro-
cedural rules and the denial of traditional constitutional protec-
tions to minors in wardship hearings was the California District
Court of Appeals, Second District, in In re Contreras,3 a 1952
case. In reversing a juvenile court's judgment of wardship
against a minor charged with assault with a deadly weapon, the
court stated: "[T]he Juvenile Court Act... never should.., be
made an instrument for the denial to a minor of a constitutional
right or of a guarantee afforded by law to an adult." 3 The de-
6. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
7. 62 Cal. 2d 350, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965). The court here
held that the introduction at trial of confessionary evidence obtained from the
defendant without warning him of his right to counsel or his right to remain
silent was necessarily prejudicial.
8. See I* re Dargo, 81 Cal. App. 2d 205, 183 P2d 282 (2d Dist Ct App.
1947); Ex parte Jones, 34 Cal. App. 2d 77, 93 P2d 185 (1st Dist. Ct. App.
1939); Hampton v. Stevenson, 210 Ga. 87, 78 S.E.2d 32 (1953).
9. CAL. WELFARM & INseTNs CoDE ANN. 503 (West 1966) which states:
"An order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be
deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose, nor shall a proceeding in the
juvenile court be deemed a criminal proceeding."
10. 46 Cal. 2d 891, 299 P.2d 875 (1956).
11. Id. at 891, 299 P.2d at 877.
12. 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d 631 (2d Dist. Ct App. 1952).
13. Id. at 789, 241 P2d at 633.
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cision of this court found some support in subsequent decisions
of other California district courts.
14
The Acuna case is seen to represent an even greater departure
from the typical California and national approach to juvenile
proceedings15 when contrasted with the decision of the California
Court of Appeals, Fifth District, in In re Castro,16 a case de-
cided three months before Acuna. The court in Castro, affirm-
ing a juvenile court's judgment of wardship against a minor
charged with committing arson, had the same question before it
regarding the extension of the Miranda, Escobedo and Dorado
doctrines to a juvenile proceeding as did the court in Acuna. In
Castro the court expressly refused to apply such doctrines to a
wardship hearing but rather excluded the extrajudicial confes-
sion of the minor by holding that such confession could nor be
used at the hearing because section 701 of the Welfare and Insti-
tutions Code' 7 prohibited it.18 The court went on to say:
If the procedure based on the Escobedo, Dorado and Miranda
cases should be held to apply in all strictness to juveniles
and juvenile proceedings in order to exclude confessions
made to peace officers, the doctrine of parens patriae would
become a hollow phrase and the juvenile court simply a
young people's criminal court .... 19
The Acuna court brushed aside the theory put forth in Castro,
by saying it "wag not dispositive of the case." 20  In failing to
14. Cf. In re Macidon, 240 A.C.A 666, 49 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1st Dist. Ct. App.
1966) ; In re Mikkelsen, 226 Cal. App. 2d 467, 38 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1964) ; In re Alexander, 152 Cal. App. 2d 458, 313 P.2d 182 (2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1957).
15. See Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959), People v.
Silverstein, 121 Cal. App. 2d 140, 262 P2d 656 (1953); see also Paulsen,
Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. Rnv. 547 (1959) ; cf. Alexander,
Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 A.B.A.J. 1206 (1960). But see
United States v. Dickerson, 168 F. Supp. 899, 901 (1958).
16. 52 Cal. Rptr. 469 (5th Dist Ct App. 1966).
17. CAL. WELFARE & IST'NS CODE ANxN. § 701 (West 1966) which reads
in part:
At the hearing, the court shall first consider only the question whether
the minor is a person described by section... 602, and for this purpose
any matter or information relevant and material to the circumstances ...
is admissible and may be received in evidence; however, a preponderance
of evidence, legally admissible in the trial of criminal cases, must be
adduced to support a finding that the minor is a person described by
section 602 ....
18. In re Castro, 52 Cal. Rptr. 469, 473-74 (5th Dist. Ct App. 1966).
19. Id. at 473.
20. It re Acuna, 53 Cal. Rptr. 884, 886 (3d Dist Ct App. 1966).
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discuss the policy reasons underlying its extension of Miranda,
E scobedo and Dorado to exclude Acuna's confessions, or to dis-
cuss exactly why protections heretofore regulating criminal
prosecutions were now applicable to a civil proceeding, the court
substantially weakened the foundation of its decision. It is high-
ly questionable whether the Supreme Court of California will
follow the unprecedented leap taken in Acuna. It would seem
more in keeping with the theory expounded in Dotson to utilize
the approach taken in Castro and apply the rules of Miranda,
Esoobedo and Dorado only to criminal proceedings.
NOTE
Recently the United States Supreme Court pre-empted further
interpretation by the California courts in its decision in Appli-
cation of Gault,21 a case decided in May of 1967.
The Court went far beyond the procedural extensions granted
in I&m re Acuna and held that not only was a juvenile defendant
entitled to counsel and freedom from self-incrimination but that
he was also entitled to confrontation with his accuser and a right
to cross-examination. Justice Fortas writing the majority opin-
ion for the court said, "A proceeding where the issue is whether
the child will be found to be 'delinquent' and subjected to the
loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a fel-
ony prosecution."
22
Thus the court with one stroke of a broad brush virtually
swept aside the previous distinctions between a criminal trial
and a juvenile court proceeding.
ELiasoN SnTH
21. 87 S. Ct. 1428.
22. Id. at 1448.
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INSURANCE-Construction of Policy Provision-The ambigu-
ous term upon in an insurance contract is given broad and liberal
construction to protect the insured. MoAbee v. Nationwide Mu-
tuaZ Insurance Company (S.C. 1967).
The insured stepped between a tractor and a farm truck to dis-
engage a tow chain connecting the vehicles. As he bent over, the
tractor began to move toward him down a slight grade. When
the shouts of bystanders attracted his attention, he placed his
hands on the front of the tractor and his back against the truck
in an effort to stop the moving tractor. The insured was crushed
to death as he was unable to hold the tractor back or to step from
between the vehicles. These facts were undisputed and the sole
question of law before thl lower court was whether or not the
insured was "in or upon, entering or alighting from" the motor
vehicle against which he was crushed. The lower court concluded
that since any immobile object would have served the same pur-
pose as the truck, the insured was not "in or upon, entering or
alighting from" the vehicle within the terms of the policy provi-
sion and denied recovery. On appeal to the Supreme Court of
South Carolina, held, reversed. The insured was "upon" the
truck and therefore within the protection of the policy. MeAbee
v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 152 S.E.2d 731 (S.C.
1967).
It is a general rule of construction that when language in an
insurance policy leads to ambiguity or uncertainty of meaning
and there is a reasonable interpretation favorable to the insured,
the terms should be liberally construed in favor of the policy
holder and strictly against the writer of the policy.' The rule
is justifiable because the insurer has exclusive control over
drafting the provisions of the questioned instrument and the
insured has paid premiums in reliance on receiving protection
as he understood the terms. The court must first determine
whether the term is ambiguous. If so, it becomes the duty of
the court to construe it in accordance with established rules of
law and to confine itself to a determination of the language em-
ployed.2  The basic premise of liberal policy construction in
favor of the insured has been followed in South Carolina3 and
1. 44 CJ.S. Insurance § 297 (1945).
2. 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 290 (1945).
3. McKendree v. Southern States Life Ins. Co., 112 S.C. 335, 99 S.E. 806
(1919).
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the decision in McAbee v. Nationwide Hut. Ins. Co.l reaffirms
and extends this position.
While the definition and interpretation of the term "upon"
finds no precedent in South Carolina law, it has been the subject
of litigation in other jurisdictions.5 Although not binding, these
decisions are interesting and somewhat persuasive. In Christof-
fer v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.," a person whose hands
were on the rear wheel of an automobile for the purpose of tak-
ing it off or putting it on, was deemed to be "upon" the automo-
bile within the meaning of the policy provision. The reasoning
was based partially on the fact that there were no exceptions, ex-
clusions, restrictions or qualifications contained within the policy
as to how one was to be upon the automobile. Similarly, parties
have been allowed to recover when injured while placing a tire
in the trunk of a car; 7 while leaning over the tailgate of a pick-
up truck to remove a container of burning fuel oil;s and while
tying up a bumper which had fallen from the front of a car.9
In a fact situation similar to that in MAcAbee the insured was al-
lowed to recover as being "upon" the car when he placed his
hands and knees on his car to try to stop it from rolling into a
wall;1° the court recognized that, "[a]nother reasonable con-
struction admittedly can be given to the expression 'in or upon'
but it is unfavorable to the insured." 1 Even the requirement
of physical contact has been relaxed or done away with on occa-
sion.12 While a majority of courts ruling on this matter have
favored liberal construction of ambiguous terms, a broad defini-
tion of "in or upon" in insurance contracts has not gained uni-
versal approval.' 3 Though the Court was not bound by any
4. 152 S.E2d 731 (S.C. 1967).
5. Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 952 (1955).
6. 123 Cal. App. 2d 979, 267 P.2d 887 (1954).
7. Madden v. Farm Bureau Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 82 Ohio App. 111, 79 N.E.
2d 586 (1948).
8. Hendricks v. American Employers Ins. Co., 247 La. 1047, 176 So. 2d 827
(1965).
9. Lokos v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 197 Misc. 40, 93 N.Y.S.2d 825 (Mun.
Ct. 1949).
10. Sherman v. New York Cas. Co., 78 1RI. 393, 82 A2d 839 (1951).
11. Id. at 841.
12. Katz v. Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp., 202 Misc. 745, 112 N.Y.S.2d
737 (Mun. Ct. 1952).
13. Turner v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. 274 Mo. 260, 202 S.W. 1078 (1918);
Bowlin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 46 Tenn. App. 260, 327 S.W.2d
66 (1959).
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prior decision, it relied heavily on Henderson. v. Hawkeye Sec.
Ins. co.,14 in which most of the cases accepting the majority
rule were cited. The ruling is also in accord -with the reasoning
of the South Carolina Supreme Court in ReynoZds v. Life and
Cas. Ins. Co., where the insured was held to be covered by a policy
provision allowing recovery for injuries received by accident in-
volving a motor vehicle "in which" the person was riding, when
in fact, the accident occurred while the policy holder was riding
outside the vehicle on the running board.16
The McAbee decision will be valuable as a precedent in view
of the purity of the issue involved. The facts were not in dis-
pute and interpretation of the questioned term was free from
dependence on other phrases in the policy. 7 Acceptance of a
rather broad definition of "upon" is in keeping with the everyday
usage of the word.'8 The construction of "upon" in this policy
should serve as a notice to writers of insurance contracts to de-
lete the word if they do not wish to extend coverage to persons
not included in the terms "in, entering, alighting from." The
ruling also sustains the general proposition stated by Justice
Woods, referring to construction of insurance policies: "If the
meaning is doubtful, or the language is calculated to mislead,
the Courts will adopt the meaning most favorable to maintaining
the liability."' 9
It appears that the South Carolina Supreme Court, in follow-
ing the majority of decisions from other jurisdictions, arrived
at the correct conclusion and reaffirmed this state's liberal view
of construction of insurance policy provisions. The decision is in
14. Henderson v. Hawkeye Security Ins. Co., 252 Iowa 97, 106 N.W2d
86 (1960).
15. 166 S.C. 214, 164 S.E. 602 (1932).
16. See Independence Ins. Co. v. Jeffries, 294 Ky. 680, 172 S.W.2d 566
(1943) ; Guaranty Trust Co. v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 159 Wash. 683, 294
P. 585 (1930).
17. But see, e.g., Madden v. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 82 Ohio App.
111, 79 N.E.2d 586 (1948); Sherman v. New York Cas. Co., 78 R.I. 393, 82
A.2d 839 (1951).
18. WFBSTE'S NEw IrmNATIoNAL DicroxARY (2d ed. 1932) defines the
word "upon" as on in all its senses. The word "on" is defined in one sense as
contiguity or independence, illustrated by examples of, "a fly on the ceiling '
and "hanging on a wall". These common usages indicate acceptance of the
word "upon" as meaning contact or support from elsewhere than beneath. See,
e.g., Christoffer v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 979, 267
P.2d 887 (1954).
19. Rawl v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 94 S.C. 299, 302, 77 S.E. 1013, 1014
(1913).
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keeping with the overall purpose of insurance contracts, and
denies the insurer the advantage of resolving an ambiguity which
it has created in its own favor to deny recovery. The individual
loss to the insurance company is greatly outweighed by the pro-
tection of the general public; as a result, insurance policies will
be characterized by more exacting language and their limitations
more clearly defined.
J. H AYmTow STEWART, III
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INSURANCE-Uninsured Motorist Provision-Insolvency of
tort-feasor's insurer subsequent to time of the accident does not
afford protection to injured party under uninsured motorist pro-
vision provided by the injured party's insurer. Pattani v. Key-
stone Ins. Co. (Pa. Super. 1966).
The appellant Pattani was involved in an automobile acci-
dent in which the driver of the other car, Miss Taylor, was in-
sured at the time of the accident. Pattani was injured during
the collision and filed suit against the other driver. Miss Taylor's
insurer appeared in her behalf, and its counsel represented her in
a compulsory arbitration proceeding. The arbitration resulted
in a finding for the appellant. No appeal was taken, and the
award became a final judgment. Shortly thereafter Miss Taylor's
insurer was declared insolvent and placed in receivership. Pat-
tani then contended that the subsequent insolvency placed him
under the protection of his uninsured motorist clause with Key-
stone Insurance Company. He attempted to compel Keystone to
arbitrate his loss, but the lower court dismissed his petition to
compel arbitration. On appeal the Superior Court of Pennsyl-
vania, held, affirmed. The uninsured motorist provision does not
apply to a motorist when the insurer of the tort-feasor at the
time of the accident is subsequently declared insolvent. Pattani
v. Keystone In. Co., 223 A.2d 899 (Pa. Super. 1966).
The Pattani case is one of first impression, and the court es-
tablished its position by interpreting a section of the insurance
policy controlled by section 40-2000 of the Pennsylvania Code.'
This statute requires that all automobile liability insurance car-
riers within the state provide coverage for losses sustained from
uninsured owners and operators of motor vehicles.
The uninsured motorist statutes in regard to the definition of
an "uninsured automobile" may be divided into three classes:
(1) Those which expressly define an "uninsured automobile" as
one which does not have automobile bodily injury liability or
bond applicable at the time of the accident, or has such insurance
but the insurer successfully denies coverage, or has such insurance
but the carrier who wrote the policy is declared insolvent; (2)
Those which define an "uninsured automobile" as one which has
no automobile bodily injury liability insurance or bond applica-
ble at the time of the accident, or has such insurance but the
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 40, § 2000 (Supp. 1965).
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company writing the same denies coverage thereunder; (3)
Those which do not expressly define an "uninsured automobile."2
The Pennsylvania statute does not define an "uninsured motor
vehicle."3 However, the insurance policies required by the stat-
ute define an "uninsured automobile" as one that:
[Has] no bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy
applicable at the time of the accident .. . or with respect to
which there is a bodily injury liability bond or insurance
policy applicable at the time of the accident but the company
writing the same denies coverage thereunder....4
In interpreting this policy definition the court stated that
it was in no way ambiguous and that the phrase "at the time of
the accident" clearly barred the appellant's attempt to relate the
insolvency back to the time of the accident. In the court's view
there was no denial of coverage, because in the terms of the pol-
icy no such coverage was contracted for or intended. It is inter-
esting to note that in support of its interpretation the court re-
ferred to the South Carolina case of Federal Z . Co. .. ,peight5
and several other decisions6 based upon Speigkt. This case in-
volved the same factual situation as Pattani. The wording of
the applicable section of the South Carolina Code7 contained in
the policy was essentially the same as that contained in the
Pennsylvania insurance policy. The point of interest is that in
referring to the 1963 South Carolina decision of iSpeight, the
Pennsylvania court ignored a subsequent 1963 amendment s to
the South Carolina Code which nullified the effect of Speight.
The amendment states that an "uninsured motor vehicle" in-
cludes one which was insured at the time of the accident, even
2. 19 S.C.L. REv. 269, 275-76 (1967).
3. Pattani v. Keystone Ins. Co., 223 A.2d 899, 901 (Pa. Super. 1966).
4. Id. at 901.
5. 220 F. Supp. 90 (E.D.S.C. 1963).
6. Swaringin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 399 S.W.2d 131 (St. Louis, Mo. Ct. App.
1966); Hardin v. American Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 261 N.C. 67, 134 S.E.2d 142
(1964).
7. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.11(3) (1962), as amended, S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 46-750.31(3) (Supp. 1966).
8. S.C. CODE ANz. § 46-750.31(3)(c) (Supp. 1966) provides as follows:
(3) The term "misured motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle as to
which...
(c) there was such insurance, but the insurance carrier who wrote the
same is declared insolvent, or is in delinquency proceedings, suspension, or
receivership, or is proven unable fully to respond to a judgment ....
(emphasis added).
[Vol. 19
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though the insurer who wrote the policy is subsequently declared
insolvent.
The South Carolina legislature amended the Motor Vehicle
Safety Responsibility Act of 19529 to provide coverage where
the insurer of the other motor vehicle is declared insolvent, or
is in delinquency proceedings, suspension, or receivership. 10
The Nort. River Ins. Co. v. Gibson 1 decision, relied upon by the
Pattani dissent, was handed down in light of the 1963 amend-
ment and held that Gibson could recover under the uninsured
motorist provision because the subsequent insolvency of the tort-
feasor's carrier denied him coverage. The court stated that the
purpose and effect of the 1963 amendment was to clarify the
existing statute rather than to extend the coverage provided by
the original statute. Legislative intent is a very important fac-
tor in statutory interpretation.' 2  Gibson indicated that the legis-
lature intended that subsequent insolvency of the tort-feasor's
carrier was to be an effective denial of coverage. This purpose
had not been recognized in Speight and the legislature quickly
responded with the amendment to clarify its original intent. In
effect the decision handed down in Gibson overrulec the result
reached in Speight. While the purpose of the amendment was
merely one of clarification, the Gibson case clearly shows the
liberal attitude and extent of coverage intended by the legisla-
ture which was not recognized in the pre-amendment days of
speight.
The reasoning of the Pennsylvania court in its reference to
Speight was similar to that of the Tennessee court in Stone v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.'s With this interpretation by the Penn-
9. S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 46-701 to -750.28 (1962).
10. Id. at § 46-750.31(3) (c) (Supp. 1966).
11. 244 S.C. 393, 137 S.E.2d 264 (1964).
12. In 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 243(a) (1953), the following is found concerning
the definition and nature of an amendment:
Whatever supplements existing legislation, in order to achieve more
successfully the societal object sought to be obtained, may be said to
amend existing legislation, and, if the aim of the new act is to clarify or
correct uncertainties which arose from enforcement of the existing statute,
or to reach situations which were not covered by the original statute, the
new act is amendatory, even though in its wording it does not purport to
amend the language of the existing statute.
13. 397 S.W2d 411, 414 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965). The plaintiff sought to
distinguish the district judge's opinion in the Speight case. The attempted
distinction was based upon the 1963 amendment enacted subsequent to Speiglt.
The Tennessee court felt that Speight did give some weight to the amendment,
but the reasoning of the opinion sustained the action of the district judge. The
judge reasoned that the liability of the insurer was determinable at the time
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sylvania court as to what constitutes an "uninsured automobile,"
Pennsylvania has in effect gone from the class three undefined
statute to the class two type of statute. The court's other alter-
native was to interpret the insurance policy definition so that it
would have the same effect of the class one type of statute which
would have allowed recovery.
This second approach was proposed in the Pattani dissent
which relied upon Gibson and State Farn Hut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Browe'.' 4 The Pennsylvania court's failure to ascertain cor-
rectly the intent of the South Carolina legislature as implied by
Gibsoit has been discussed. This liberal coverage attitude leads
to another important consideration in regard to the protection of
the innocent wreck victim. The consideration is one of extended
coverage by judicial interpretation which is expressly stated by
the Virginia court in Brower.15
We do not think our statutes on the subject should be nar-
rowly construed. We have previously expressed the view
that the Virginia uninsured motorist legislation is remedial
in nature, being for the purpose of protecting the innocent
victims of irresponsible motorists. 'The legislation having
been enacted for the benefit of the injured parties, it is to
be liberally construed so that the purpose intended may be
accomplished.' 6
According to the latest statisticsY it would appear that liberal
extension of coverage by the courts would be encouraged. How-
ever some take exception to this approach and feel that the courts
have exceeded their bounds by affording greater protection to
victims of uninsured motorists than the victims of insured motor-
ists."' Advocates of this view do agree, however, that coverage
of the accident, and the subsequent insolvency of the other carrier did not bring
the case within the "uninsured motorist" definition of the policy. The Tennes-
see court stated that to allow recovery would have the effect of eliminating
from the policy the phrase "applicable at the time of the accident."
14. 204 Va. 887, 134 S.E.2d 277 (1964).
15. In a situation similar to Pattani the Virginia court found that the insur-
ance company which wrote the policy effectively denied coverage of Brower.
Denial of coverage does not have to be expressed, and it may effectively be
made by the conduct of the carrier.
16, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brower, 204 Va. 887, 891-92, 134
S.E.2d 277, 281 (1964), quoting from Strom v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 199 Va.
130, 135, 97 S.E.2d 759, 762 (1957).
17. See 10 VILL. L. REv. 545, 556 n.54 (1965).
18, Denny, Uninsured Motorist Coverage-Present and Future, 52 VA. L.
Rrv. 538, 556 (1966).
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should be extended to those persons who are not presently cov-
ered by existing statutes.19 The need for such extension is elo-
quently expressed by many who now realize that their "uninsured
motorist" statutes fall short of the desired protection. 20 The
innocent bear the burden.
In jurisdictions such as Virginia the courts have realistically
faced up to the inequities which arise. Conversely the Pennsyl-
vania courts have avoided the issue and placed the burden upon
the legislature. 2' By its own admission the court in denying
Pattani coverage as an "uninsured motorist" states that it is
"well aware of the detriment suffered by the innocent appellants
in this decision." 22 It would appear mandatory that states such
as Pennsylvania supplement the rather incomplete protections
provided by existing legislation. 23
EDWAR P. GuEumA, JR.
19. In many states certain victims of automobile collisions are not covered,
i.e., victims of "hit-and-run", stolen vehicles, and unauthorzied drivers. See,
e.g., 19 ARE. L. REv. 377 (1966).
20. 19 ARm L. Rav. 377, 379 (1966) ; 43 ORa. L. Rv. 267, 276 (1965). Both
of these articles conclude, as do many others, that there is quite a need for ex-
tension of coverage to those persons who are not effectively covered under the
existing statutes.
21. Such legislation is all too often passed, if passed at all, after the inequity
has been borne. Subsequent legislation may be cumbersome, untimely, and ex-
pensive. Judicial opinion in this area may be more flexible and mete out justice
swiftly to strike down inequities as they arise. Extension of coverage by judi-
cial decision may be kept within bounds by limiting recoveries to those which
the injured party would have been entitled to had the tort-feasor been effectively
insured.
22. Pattani v. Keystone Ins. Co., 223 A2d 899, 902 (Pa. Super. 1966).
23. 10 VmL. L. REv. 545, 556 (1965). The author concludes that innumer-
able problems are involved in effecting this type of legislation:
[H] owever one can also appreciate the fact that states such as New York,
New Jersey, Maryland, North Dakota, New Hampshire, Florida, Vir-
ginia, South Carolina and California have surmounted these problems
and now offer more complete protection to the victim of the financially
irresponsible motorists than does Pennsylvania.
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TAXATION-Construction of Word "Earned"-Where total in-
come derived from a contract was contingent on sales experience
subsequent to the effective date of a statute allowing capital gains
treatment, the taxpayer was entitled to such treatment on income
received after that date. Hunt v. Bouth Carolina Tax Commis-
sion (S.C. 1967).
In 1958 the plaintiff assigned her patents on a certain device
used in textile machinery to a manufacturing concern in consid-
eration of a stipulated royalty to be paid per unit manufactured
and sold by the assignee. For the period January 1,1959, through
December 31, 1961, the assignment contract set out minimum
numbers of units to be shipped each year, with a further provi-
sion that if the assignee failed to meet its quota for any particu-
lar year by not more than ten per cent, it would not be considered
in default if the quotas for the next two years were exceeded by
the number of units lacdng. The amount of liquidated damages,
in case of default, was made dependent oA the time period in
which default occurred and the number of units actually shipped.
The plaintiff filed state income tax returns on a cash receipts
and disbursements basis. Beginning in 1960 she deducted from
gross income one-half the royalty payments received from her as-
signee pursuant to section 65-258(6) of the South Carolina
Code,1 allowing capital gains treatment "with respect to income
earned on or after January 1, 1960."2 In 1965 the South Carolina
Tax Commission ruled that total income derived from the con-
tract had been "earned" in 1958 when the contract was signed,
prior to the effective date of section 65-258(6). The plaintiff
brought suit to recover the additional taxes assessed, which had
been paid under protest. The lower court held that royalties
in excess of the minimum quotas set out were contingent on fu-
ture events, therefore "earned" only upon receipt and properly
subject to the deduction allowed by section 65-258(6); but that
payments derived from the minimum quotas were fixed, therefore
"earned" in 1958 and not subject to capital gains treatment. From
this order allowing only partial recovery, the plaintiff appealed.
1. "For the purposes of this chapter, the term 'adjusted gross income' means,
in the case of an individual, gross income minus: ... (6) One half of gains
and losses arising from the sale or exchange of capital assets .... " S.C.
CODE ANN. § 65-258 (1962).
2. LI S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 1660, 1662 (No. 690, 1960) (emphasis added).
Section 7 of Act No. 690 was omitted from section 65-258 of the Code, which
omission was not questioned by the court.
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina, held, reversed. Where
it was not the intention of the contracting parties to establish a
separate minimum consideration for the taxable years in question,
all income received in 1960 and thereafter was "earned" after
the effective date of section 65-258(6) and properly subject to
capital gains treatment. Hunt v. South Carolina Tax Commis-
sion, 153 S.E.2d 321 (S.C. 1967).
The problem of when income is taxable most often arises with
reference to the particular accounting convention used by the
taxpayer. Under the cash receipts and disbursements system, a
taxpayer reports income in the year in which it is actually re-
ceived. On the other hand, it is not actual receipt, but the right
to receive, that determines in what year income is taxable under
the accrual system of accounting. The right to receive arises
when an item of income has become fixed and definite. If either
the existence of an obligation or its amount is contingent on
future events, income to be derived therefrom has not accrued for
tax purposes.8
It was established in Adams v. Burts4 that this basic criterion
used in accrual method accounting was also applicable in deter-mining whether income had been earned before or after the ef-
fective date of section 65-258(6), and the particular accounting
convention actually used by the taxpayer for reporting income
was regarded as immaterial in determining the year in which
the income was earned. Specifically, the court rejected the con-
tention that a cash basis taxpayer who had elected the install-
ment method 5 of reporting income could earn income only as it
was received." The court reasoned that the legislature had not
intended to give benefits to a cash basis taxpayer not available
to an accrual basis taxpayer and concluded that "real facts, not
bookkeeping entries ... give rise to taxable income under tax
statutes."7 The proper rule was stated as follows: "Income is
3. See generally Johnson v. South Carolina Tax Conm'n, 235 S.C. 155, 160-
161, 110 S.E.2d 173, 175-176 (1959).
4. 245 S.C. 339, 140 S.E2d 586 (1965).
5. S.C. CoD. ANN. § 65-286 (1962) provides for installment accounting.
Section 65-286 was made effective for taxable years after December 31, 1960.
LII S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 226, 228 (No. 165, 1961). However, plaintiff's
use of this method between 1958 and 1961 was approved by the tax commission
and not questioned by the court. But see Heyward v. South Carolina Tax
Comm'n, 240 S.C. 347, 126 S.E2d 15 (1962).
6. But see Randall, Taxation, 1964-1965 Survey of South Carolina Law, 18
S.C.L. REv. 131, 138-140 (1966).
7. Adams v. Burts, 245 S.C. 339, 344, 140 S.E2d 586, 589 (1965).
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earned when all events have occurred which fix its amount and
determine the liability of the party from whom it is forthcoming
to pay."" On this basis Adams held that a fixed consideration
from the sale of timber, even though payable in installments
between 1958 and 1962, was earned entirely in 1958 and not
subject to section 65-258(6).9
The lower court in Hunt based its rationale on Adams. It rea-
soned that royalties due from the minimum quotas set out in the
contract were a fixed and definite liability in 1958. The Supreme
Court, however, did not so construe the contract. Its terms did
not evidence an intention of the parties to create a divisible obli-
gation'°-that is, to create one obligation on the minimum num-
ber of units whicl could be shipped and, then, to create a sep-
arate obligation on any excess which might be shipped. It is a
well established rule that the intention of the parties, to be de-
rived from the language and subject matter of the contract, is
controlling on the issue of whether it is entire or divisible. A
contract may be divisible by its very nature, yet rendered entire
by the intention of the parties."' Evidence of the parties' intent
was found in the provision allowing a ten per cent variance in
the quota for any one year, as well as the provision establishing
liquidated damages as contingent on the number of units actually
sold. Since the parties did not intend to establish a separate
minimum obligation for the years in question, all income received
after January 1, 1960, was earned after the effective date of sec-
tion 65-258(6) and properly subject to capital gains treatment.
The Hunt decision, however, does more than construe the word
"earn" as used in a particular tax statute. Since the basic cri-
terion of accrual method accounting was applied by the court,
Hunt is also significant with respect to the analogous problem
of when income should be reported by an accrual basis taxpayer.
This particular significance of Hunt is illustrated by a federal
8. Id. at 346, 140 S.E.2d at 588.
9. The court also relied on Fennell v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 233 S.C.
43, 46, 103 S.E.2d 424, 426 (1958) for the proposition that "a taxpayer claim-
ing a deduction must bring himself squarely within the terms of a statute ex-
pressly authorizing it." However, in Hunt the court noted that LI S.C. STATS.
AT LANE 1660, 1662 (No. 690, 1960) used the word "exclusion" rather than
"deduction".
10. For an explanation of what constitutes a divisible contract, see Packard
v. Byrd, 73 S.C. 1, 6, 51 S.E. 678, 679 (1905).
11. See, e.g., Shepherd v. Richmond Eng'r Co., 184 Va. 802, 807, 36 S.E.2d
531, 534 (1946).
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court decision dealing with a similar fact situation, but with
respect to an accrual basis taxpayer. In Commissioner v. R.-J.
Darnell, Ie. 12 the taxpayer contracted in 1928 to sell a sawmill
for a fixed consideration. Included in the contract was the pro-
vision that a minimum of forty million feet of logs was to be
delivered to the purchaser at a price per million feet fixed in the
contract. It was further provided that a premium would be
paid to the seller for each million feet delivered in excess of the
minimum and a penalty assessed for each million feet less than
the minimum. The seller, who kept his records on the accrual
basis, did not report any income from the transaction for the
year 1928. After additional taxes were assessed on profit gained
from the sawmill alone, the court held that because of the penalty
provision, total income from the contract was contingent on the
quantity of logs to be delivered, thus no income had accrued in
the year 1928. In a rationale similar to that in Hunt, the court
regarded the sale of the sawmill and the sale of the logs as parts
of an indivisible contract."
The Hunt decision, however, is determinative only of a very
narrow issue which could arise in the broad area of accrual
method accounting. Moreover, as evidenced by the abundance
of litigation in point, these problems do not lend themselves to
easy solution. Since the basic principle for determining when
income should be reported under the accrual system is well estab-
lished, the cases in this area necessarily turn on minute factual
distinctions.14 No doubt Hunt's significance with respect to
accrual accounting is also limited in scope to the particular facts
of the transaction.
ROBERT M. E~ei
12. 60 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1932).
13. The rationale of this decision was questioned by judge Learned Hand in
General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Helvering, 89 F.2d 882, 884 (2d Cir. 1937).
14. See, e.g., Frost Lumber Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 128 F.2d 693 (5th
Cir. 1942); Johnson v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 235 S.C. 155, 110 S.E.2d
173 (1959). For a discussion of Johnson see Randall, Taxation, 1959-1960
Survey of S.C. Law, 13 S.C.L.Q. 381, 383-386 (1961).
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TORTS-Absolute Privilege To Defame-The defense of abso-
lute privilege in a libel action is available to the New York City
Board of Higher Education. Lombardo v. Stoke (N.Y. 1966).
The Board of Higher Education of New York City had been
charged with anti-Catholic bias in faculty promotions at Queens
College. These charges and accusations had been given wide
publicity, and in response to the charges Howard Stoke, presi-
dent of Queens College, with the knowledge and consent of the
Board of Higher Education, issued a press release in order to
express publicly the position of the Board. The plaintiffs, who
were faculty members at Queens College, instituted an action to
recover damages resulting from alleged defamatory statements
contained in the press release. The trial court entered an order
denying the motion of the defendants for summary judgment and
appeal was taken. The Appellant Division of the New York
Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department reversed the
order, granted the motion and dismissed the complaint.- On
appeal the New York Court of Appeals, held, affirmed. Since
the New York City Board of Higher Education had had its
integrity severely challenged by charges of anti-Catholic bias at
Queens College and since the accusations had been given wide
publicity, public expression of the position of the Board was an
appropriate exercise of its discretion and was absolutely privi-
leged. Lombardo v. Stoke, 18 N.Y.2d 394, 222 N.E.2d 721, 276
N.YS.2d 97 (1966).
Judge Learned Hand persuasively enunciated the rationale for
extending the defense of absolute privilege to public officials in
libel suits involving alleged defamatory statements made in con-
nection with official business.
The justification for doing so is that it is impossible to
know whether the claim is well founded until the case has
been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent as
well as the guilty to the burden of a trial and to the inevita-
ble danger of its outcome would dampen the ardor of all
but the most resolute, or most irresponsible, in the unflinch-
ing discharge of their duties.... [I]t has been thought in
the end better to leave unredressed the wrong done by dis-
1. 24 App. Div. 2d 574, 262 N.Y.S.2d 806 (1965).
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honest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty
to the constant dread of retaliation.2
Both federal3 and state4 courts have recognized that the Presi-
dent of the United States, the Governor of any state, the Cabinet
officers of the United States and the corresponding officers of
any state are absolutely privileged to publish defamatory state-
ments about another in the exercise of an executive function pro-
vided the subject matter of the statement has some relation to
the executive proceeding in which the officer is acting.5
In Ba- v. latteo0 the Supreme Court held that a press release
issued by the Acting Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization
announcing his intention to suspend two employees of the agency
for conduct for which the agency had been criticized was within
the scope of the director's duties, and that he could not be held
liable for alleged libelous statements contained in the release.
Thus some federal officers below the cabinet level have the de-
fense of absolute privilege when the alleged libelous statements
are made in connection with official functions even though the
statements appear in a public news release. Most state courts,
however, have refused to extend an absolute privilege to lower
level officials such as superintendents of schools, mayors, alder-
men, prosecuting attorneys, policemen and state investigators.7
The defense of absolute privilege of government officers while
acting in their official capacity has been recognized in New York,
based upon "consideration of public policy . . . [intended] to
secure the unembarassed and efficient administration of justice
and public affairs .... ',8 In the New York case of Sherdan V.
Crisona,9 the plaintiff was allegedly defamed in an official re-
2. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
3. E.g., Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896) (Postmaster General) ; Glass
v. Ickes, 117 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 718 (1941)
(Secretary of the Interior) ; Mellon v. Brewer, 18 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir. 1927),
cert. denied, 275 U.S. 530 (1927) (Secretary of the Treasury).
4. E.g., Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A.2d 892 (1952) (Attorney
General); Ryan v. Wilson, 231 Iowa 33, 300 N.W. 707 (1941) (Governor).
5. RESTATIEENT OF TORTS § 591 (1938) ; cf. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS
§ 95 (2d ed. 1955).
6. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
7. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 109, (3d ed. 1964); accord, Ranous v.
Hughes, 30 Wis. 2d 452, 141 N.W.2d 251 (1966) (member of Board of Edu-
cation) ; Peterson v. Steenerson, 113 Minn. 87, 129 N.W. 147 (1910) (Post-
master).
8. Hemmens v. Nelson, 138 N.Y. 517, 523, 34 N.E. 342, 344 (1893).
9. Sheridan v. Crisona, 14 N.Y.2d 108, 198 N.E.2d 359, 249 N.Y.S.2d 161
(1964).
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port which had been submitted by the borough president of
Queens to the mayor of New York and released to the newspapers
three months later. The court held that the borough president
was acting within the scope of his official powers with the result
that the statements made in the report and the news release were
absolutely privileged. Thus, the Court of Appeals in New York
had previously granted the defense of absolute privilege to an
important municipal official. This case was cited as authority
for holding that the Board of Higher Education was absolutely
privileged in the case of Lombardo v. Stoke.10
Although the allegedly defamatory press release in Lombardo
was issued by the president of Queens College, he was acting with
the knowledge and consent of the Board of Higher Education,
and the court's decision was based upon the board's privilege
which could be invoked by President Stoke who was acting at
the board's direction and in its behalf.
In deciding that the Board of Higher Education should enjoy
the defense of absolute privilege, the court noted that the board
was an "important agency" of municipal government." Sheri-
dan extended the defense of absolute privilege to a principal
municipal officer and the court in Lombardo took the next step
by granting the defense of absolute privilege to an important
municipal agency, clearly extending the law as laid down in
Sherdan.1
2
In resolving the question of whether the issuance of the public
news release was within the official duties of the Board of Higher
Education, the court observed that at this time, when so much
attention has been focused upon the elimination of prejudice in
our school systems, it is of vital importance that the public be
informed of the merits of such charges as anti-Catholic bias and
prejudice. In Sheridan the court noted that the report released
to the press was of public concern, and recognized that the de-
fendant (borough president) had a legal duty under the New
10. Lombardo v. Stoke, 18 N.Y.2d 394, 222 N.E.2d 721, 276 N.Y.S.2d
97 (1966). It is interesting to note that Scileppi, J., who was the lone dis-
senter in Lombardo, wrote the majority opinion in Sheridan.
11. Id. at 400, 222 N.E.2d at 723-24, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
12. It should be noted that, although the case never reached the court of
appeals, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department,
in Smith v. Helbraim, 251 N.Y.S.2d 533, 21 App. Div. 2d 830 (1964), extended
the defense of absolute privilege to a city board of education. Accord, Thomp-
son v. Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Huntington, 45 Misc. 2d 916, 258
N.Y.S.2d 307 (Sup. Ct. 1965); contra, Ranous v. Hughes, 30 Wis. 2d 452,
141 N.W.2d 251 (1966).
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York City Charter'13 to make the report available to the public
on demand. There was no evidence that the Board of Higher
Education in Lombardo was under such an official duty. Thus,
in this respect also, the court went a step beyond their decision
in Sheridan. The court, in deciding that the press release was
protected by absolute privilege, adopted the view of the United
States Supreme Court expressed in the Barr case in which the
Court observed, "It would be an unduly restrictive view of the
scope of the duties of a policy making executive official to hold
that a public statement of agency policy in respect to matters of
wide public interest and concern is not action in the line of
duty."'
4
This extension in New York may have been predicated upon
the peculiar facts of the instant case in which the publication
of the press release complained of was clearly appropriate. Nev-
ertheless, it appears that the policy argument enunciated by
Judge Learned Hand has greatly influenced the series of cases
preceding and including Lombardo, and it can reasonably be
anticipated to influence subsequent decisions in this area. Ac-
cordingly, one might reasonably expect that, as applied to future
cases, this decision will not be restricted to its facts and may
well be applied to situations in which the allegedly defamatory
statements are not of such vital public interest and concern as
they were here.
AxcOH L. HARMAN
13. NEw YORK CITY CHARTER § 893 (1949), as revised, Naw YORK CITY
CHARTER § 1113 (1963).
Heads of departments to furnish copies of papers on demand. - The
heads of all departments, except the police and law departments, and the
chiefs of each and every division or bureau thereof and all borough presi-
dents, shall, with reasonable promptness, furnish to any taxpayer desiring
the same, a true and certified copy of any book, account or paper kept by
such department, bureau or officer, or such part thereof as may be de-
manded, upon payment in advance of ten cents for every hundred words
thereof by the person demanding the same. The provisions of this section
shall not apply to any papers prepared by or for the comptroller for use
in any proceeding to adjust or pay a claim against the city or any agency
or by or for counsel for use in actions or proceedings to which the city,
or any agency is a party or for use in any investigation authorized by
this charter.
14: Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959).
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